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Jurisdiction

•

Appellate jurisdiction is vested in the Court of Appeals under Utah Code
Annotated ("UCA") §78A-4-103(2)(i), and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Issues for Review
Standards of Review
Preservation
1.

Mechanic's Lien Attorney Fees.

Defendant summarily defeated Plaintiff's two

mechanic's liens before trial. The Mechanic's Lien statute, UCA §38-1-18, provides for
attorney fees, as a matter of law, to the successful party defending against a lien under
UCA §38-1-3. The trial court denied Defendant's attorney fees for successfully defeating

the liens, and awarded Plaintiff its attorney fees for losing them.
Issue for Review: In its interpretation of UCA §38-1-18, did the trial court
err in awarding attorney fees to the losing party on the mechanic's liens?
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation and legislative intent are
questions of law, reviewed de novo for correctness.

See Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, f/8, 123 P.3d 400; Gonzales v.
Morris, 610 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Utah 1980) (citing Henrie v. Rocky
Mountain Packaging Corp., 113 Utah 444, 202 P.2d 727 (1949))
Preservation: Appellant preserved this issue in the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. (R. 143-152)

2.

Wrongful Lien. The Wrongful Lien statute, UCA §38-9-1, specifies that a lien is

wrongful, and subject to legislated sanctions, if it is not authorized by statue, the court,
or the property owner.

Plaintiff's mechanic's lien on Defendant's property had no

statutory authorization. Though the mechanic's lien did not cross the statutory
'entitlement' threshold of UCA §38-1-3, the trial court ruled it was not wrongful because
it was "statutory," but "unenforceable."
Issue for Review: In its interpretation of UCA §38-1-3 and UCA §38-9-1,
holding that Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was not wrongful, did the trial court
err in denying statutory damages and attorney fees to Defendant?
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation and legislative intent are
questions of law, reviewed de nova for correctness.

Pratt v. Pugh, 2010 UT App 219, 1[7, 238 P.3d 1073; Russell v.
Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, 1[8, 999 P.2d 1244
Preservation: Appellant preserved this issue in the Counter Petition to
Nullify Wrongful Lien. (R. 17-31)

3.

Contract. Plaintiff and Defendant formed a contract for electrical services. At

trial, Plaintiff advocated only for an express contract. Despite the court's finding that
there was never an agreement on price, the court ruled there was an express contract
and awarded Plaintiff the full amount of charges it arbitrarily computed.
Issue for Review: Without an agreement for price, did the trial court err in
its conclusion of law, that there was an express contract formed between
Plaintiff and Defendant, rather than a contract implied-in-fact?
Standard of Review:
correctness.

Questions of law are reviewed de novo for

John Deere Co. v. A & H Equip., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct.App.
1994) (citing Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582,
583 (Utah App.1992))
Preservation: Appellant preserved this issue in the Written Closing
Argument of Defendant. (R. 602-622}

2

•
Statutes Of Interpretative Importance To Determine Appeal
1. UCA §38-1-3:

Mechanic's Liens (Addendum)

2. UCA §38-1-18: Mechanic's Lien Attorney Fees (Addendum)
3. UCA §38-9-1:

Wrongful Liens (Addendum)

4. UCA §38-9-4:

Wrongful Lien Sanctions (Addendum)

Statement of the Case

•

This simple contract case over a disputed electrical services invoice totaling

$1,827.61 is now entering its sixth year of litigation, generating attorney fees that are on
course to exceed $100,000, and consuming significant judicial resources. The amount at

t

stake was never the $1,827.61 invoice total, but only a few hundred dollars. By the end
of this litigation, attorney fees will approximate 10,000% of those few hundred. The
disproportionate value of wasted judicial resources can never be calculated.
In March 2011, Plaintiff, 1-D Electric (1-D), worked one day on a house in Herriman
owned by Defendant, Linda Gillman (Gillman), and sent her an invoice. She immediately

•

disputed the amount as excessive and offered to pay a reasonable sum. 1 1-D refused to
negotiate over the few hundred dollars of difference, instead electing the harshest
device at its disposal-mechanic's liens .

•

1-D filed two successive mechanic's liens.

Both were unlawful.

Both were

eventually defeated summarily, but not before tens of thousands of dollars in attorney
fees were expended.

1

The mammoth attorney fees arising from I-D's failed mechanic's

Exhibit 6, May 6, 2011 Gillman Letter to 1-D

3

liens would drive this case, not the underlying contract claim. (R. 752:3 2; 757:7-758:83;

Compounding the litigation complications and expense 1-D instigated with the
two mechanic's liens, the first lien was filed against a Salt Lake condominium Gillman
owned that was unrelated to the electrical work on the Herriman house, introducing the
collateral issue of whether this first lien, merely purporting to authority under the
Mechanic's Lien statute, UCA §38-1-3, also qualified as "wrongful" under UCA §38-9-1,
the Wrongful Lien statute.
The mechanic's liens and the wrongful lien issue completely engulfed the
litigation for more than three years. By the time the second lien on the Herriman house
was dismissed on summary judgment in July 2013, 1-D had done nothing to prosecute
the contract claim, but accumulated attorney fees were massive-all attributed to the
lien issues. (R. 753:8 2 ; 758:10 3 ) No discovery was ever conducted in this case. (R. 753:72;
758:9 3}

The bloated attorney fees on lien litigation became the impossible barrier to a

~

negotiated resolution of the case, as 1-D jockeyed for some means of escaping that
liability. 1-D would not negotiate a resolution without the quid pro quo that Gillman first
abandon her statutory right to attorney fees for defeating the liens. (R. 752:32; 757:5758:83; 759:11 3 ) Meanwhile, the contract claim lay dormant and the court twice ordered
2 Af(idavit

of Mark D. Stubbs, Attorney For Defendant
Declaration of Paul D. Dodd, Attorney For Defendant
4 Order on Motion For Attorney Fees
3

4

•

1-D to show cause why it should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 243-2445;

®

294-295 6)

The second order to show cause in February 2014, finally forced 1-D to

confront the contract claim, which would not commence until July 2014, more than
three years after the onset of litigation.
1-D voluntarily dismissed the first lien. Judge Anthony Quinn's summary dismissal
of the second lien in July 2013 was a crucial juncture in the case. Gillman had defeated
~

both mechanic's liens and held the statutory right to attorney fees, which then
exceeded $12,000. (R. 387:18-20 7; 753:1a8}

Facing that statutory obligation, 1-D shifted

its litigation strategy in the summer of 2013, cultivating a theme that would endure
throughout trial and beyond:
Gillman was to blame for I-D's misplaced mechanic's liens because
she knew, or should have known, that they were unlawful, and
she failed to correct 1-D before those liens conclusively broke lien
law.

1-D further postulated that Gillman was accountable for I-D's exposure under the
Wrongful Lien statute, creating the wrongful lien as a "cause of action" by her conduct:
If Gillman had just educated 1-D in time to evade the illegality of
the mechanic's liens, the wrongful lien on the Salt Lake condo
could never have been an issue .

•

This unfounded,

'Gillman-fault' theory depended on re-litigation of the

mechanic's lien issue, which 1-D accomplished at trial, countermanding Judge Quinn's
Order to Show Cause, May 2, 2013
to Show Cause, February 7, 2014
7 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
8 Affidavit of Mark D. Stubbs, Attorney For Defendant

5

6 Order

5

summary judgment decision in July 2013 and taking advantage of the fragmented
oversight by no fewer than six judges in the case. 9
The appropriate, remaining issues for trial were the contract claim and the
wrongful lien question.

The mechanic's liens and the lien foreclosure actions were

summarily disposed long before trial. Nevertheless, the court included in its contract
and wrongful lien rulings, the 'Gillman-fault' mantra, re-litigating the mechanic's liens to
assess Gillman for attorney fees and costs expended throughout the litigation.
In its Complaint, 1-D pied its express contract claim and alternatives of quantum
meruit and unjust enrichment. (R. 80:23-81:2610)

At trial, 1-D argued only for an express

contract, and the court entered both findings and conclusions to that effect.

The

solitary writing between Gillman and 1-D was a sketchy work order that included no
pricing. The court entered a finding that there was never an agreement for price, which
was incompatible with its conclusion of law that there was a binding, express contract.
Consistent with its conclusion that the contract was express, the court awarded 1-D its
full charges of $1,827.61 as damages.
The court ruled that the mechanic's lien on the Salt Lake condo was not wrongful,
because it was "statutory," albeit "unenforceable." Applying the 'Gillman-fault' theory,
the court drew a conclusion of law that it was Gil/man's conduct that made the

9

This case was originally assigned to Judge Anthony Quinn. Judge Quinn's two accidents
moved the case through the hands of six judges (Quinn, Faust, Lindberg, Pueller, Parker,
McKelvie). Judge McKelvie inherited the case in July 2014, at pre-trial.
10 Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint
6

mechanic's lien unenforceable. Hence, the court denied her any damages because she

created "the wrongful lien cause of action."
The only contractual writing between 1-D and Gillman was the work order.

•

It

included a provision for "reasonable" attorney fees. The court made no attempt to
calculate attorney fees on the "reasonable" basis of those factors, as grounded in law,
and entered no findings on that core precedent. Invoking the 'Gillman-fault' maxim, the

•

court awarded 1-D its fees in equity, because:
•

The Herriman house mechanic's lien was not unlawful.

•

Gillman did not timely pay the express contract obligation, which
virtually compelled 1-D to file the mechanic's liens-making her
responsible for all the consequences.

•

Gillman conspired to use I-D's "harmless error" on its mechanic's
liens to "create a wrongful lien cause of action."

The court awarded 1-D $27,821.96 for attorney fees in June 2015, which included
24% in pre-judgment interest that Plaintiff did not plead, but the court bestowed, sua

sponte.

Combined contract damages, attorney fees, and interest totaled to a judgment

of $31,458.02.
1-D filed for an amended judgment on July 15, 2015, seeking additional attorney

•

fees of $5,481.27, increasing the total judgment to $36,939.29. The court entered I-D's
proposed order for the amended judgment two days later on July 17, 2015, allowing
Gillman no chance to respond. Gillman filed Notice of Appeal on August 10, 2015.

•

7

Statement of Facts

1.

Gillman resided in a Salt Lake City condominium she owned ("Salt Lake condo").
Gillman jointly owned a house in Herriman ("Herriman house").

(R. 652:19,

Findings of Fact; 403-404:2-4, Affidavit of Defendant)

2.

March 10, 2011:

Gillman engaged 1-D for electrical service on the Herriman

house, meeting 1-D there in the afternoon to review the work. Gillman's primary
purpose was to clear the trusses in the garage attic of electrical wires, so that a
floor could be laid to accommodate storage. (R. 648:3 11, Findings of Fact, 404:7,
Affidavit of Defendant)

3.

March 11, 2011 (Friday): 1-D worked one day on the Herriman house. Gillman
was there most of the day and signed a work order before leaving. (R. Exhibit 2;
404-405:10-11,13, Affidavit of Defendant; 648:4-6, 653:24-25, Findings of Fact)

4.

March 12, 2011 (Saturday):

Gillman returned to the Herriman house and

discovered 1-D had not moved most of the wiring that cluttered the garage attic
trusses, preventing installation of the attic floor that was the primary purpose of
the work: The main electrical line, 220 line, ground line, coaxial line, telephone
lines, and other romex lines still randomly draped the area. (R. 650:12, Findings of
Fact; 405:12, Affidavit of Defendant; 1324:13-18; 1355:6-17; 1356:24-1358:1; 1382:11383:3}
11The

court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Order On Motion For Attorney
Fees did not fully designate paragraphs by number or letter. For convenience of reference,
those designations were added to the court's originals and appear as superscript. The altered
originals are Tab #1 and Tab #2 in the Addendum.

8

5.

March 14, 2011 (Monday}: Kim Olson, president of 1-D, called Gillman to report
that the cost of the work was $1,827.61. Gillman protested immediately.
(R. 405:15., Affidavit of Defendant; 1112:20-23; 1186:10-17; 1190:19-23)

6.

March 24, 2011: 1-D sent Gillman an invoice for $1,827.61. Gillman made a hand
notation on the remittance copy, asking for a labor allocation against each of the
tasks on the work order and mailed it back. (R. Exhibit 4; 654:28, Findings of Fact;

•

405:16-17, Affidavit of Defendant; 1366:13-22)

7.

April 7, 2011:

Olson responded by letter to Gillman's request for the labor

allocation. (R. Exhibit 5; 650:12, Findings of Fact; 405:17-18, Affidavit of Defendant)
8.

May 6, 2011:

Gillman replied to Olson's labor breakdown, challenging the

validity of the charges and offering to pay a reasonable amount for the work
accomplished.

•

1-D never answered. (R. Exhibit 6; 405-406:19-22, Affidavit of

Defendant; 1145:2-9; 1169:5-13; 1366:23-1368:9; 1371:25-1372:3)

9.

May 12, 2011:

Olson turned the Gillman account over to I-D's counsel for

collection. {R. 607, Billing Records, Brady Gibbs)

(j)

10.

June 15, 2011 (approx.}: Gillman was out of town until about mid-June. On her
return, notice of certified mail was waiting, but had already been returned to the
sender on May 28 th • The postman had written "Wrona Law Firm" on the notice.
Not recognizing the name, Gillman found a number and called to inquire after the
certified mail. She was connected to Brady Gibbs (Gibbs), who informed her that
a lien had been filed against her property to collect the 1-D invoice.
9

Gillman

expressed surprise that a lien would be filed over such a small amount of money,
particularly since Olson had never replied to her May 6th letter, offering to settle.

•

Gillman specifically advised Gibbs that she was working out of state and could be
gone for weeks at a time, asking him to send her regular mail, not time-sensitive
certified mail, as she might not be in town to receive it. Gibbs did not comply,
twice sending more certified mail that was returned while Gillman was away.
Gillman offered Gibbs $650 to settle. (R. 406:23-407:27, Affidavit of Defendant:
Exhibits 8, 9, 26; 1368:12-1372:13; 1375:24-1376:4; 1147:24-1148:22)

11.

Following this initial phone call with Gibbs, Gillman checked the County
Recorder's records for a lien on the Herriman house, but found nothing.

(R.

•

654:30, Findings of Fact; 406:26-407:29, Affidavit of Defendant; 1375:13-1376:4)

Unknown to Gillman at the time, 1-D had recorded a mechanic's lien against her
Salt Lake City condominium, where no work or materials were ever provided,
claiming authority under UCA §38-1-3.

(R. Exhibit 10; 654:30, Findings of Fact;

407:29, Affidavit of Defendant)

12.

June 21, 2011 (approx.):

Gibbs called Gillman to convey a counteroffer of

$1,650, which Gillman evaluated as unrealistic. She suggested Gibbs ask 1-D for a
more equitable amount.

Gibbs never contacted Gillman again to pursue

settlement negotiation. (R. 407:27, Affidavit of Defendant: 1372:24-1373:9; 1145:2-9)
Olson testified at trial that he directed Gibbs to convey a lower counteroffer of
$1,350. (R. 1215:1-10} Gillman testified she never heard that number, except
10

•

during Olson's trial testimony. Gibbs' billing records indicate no other phone calls
~

to Gillman. {R. 1373:25-1374:10; 670}
13.

During the call, Gillman asked Gibbs to confirm that a lien had been filed, as she
could not find one in the county records, which he did. Gillman checked the
county records twice in succeeding weeks, but found no lien on the Herriman
house. (R. 407:28-29, Affidavit of Defendant; 1375:13-1376:4; 1145:10-16; 1147:2-10}

@

14.

-+

Sept. 8, 2011: The 180-day, statutory deadline to file a mechanic's lien on the
Herriman house expired, as a matter of law, under UCA §38-1-3.

15.

September 22, 2011: I-D filed suit to foreclose the mechanic's lien on the Salt
Lake condo. {R. 1-11, Complaint, Summons)

16.

September 25, 2011 (approx.): Service of the foreclosure lawsuit 12 was Gillman's
first information that I-D had filed a lien on the Salt Lake condo.

(R. 654:30,

Findings of Fact; 407:29, Affidavit of Defendant; 1373:10-12; 1148:12-1149:17)

mechanic's lien notice was appended to the Complaint.

The

{R. Exhibit 10; 1-8,

Complaint)

17.

November 4, 2011: I-D filed a lis pendens on the Salt Lake condo, almost two
months past the statutory deadline. (R. Exhibit 11)

18.

November 11, 2011: Gillman personally delivered a letter to I-D-notifying that
the mechanic's lien and lis pendens on the Salt Lake condo had no legal basis,

c,

Gillman was not personally served with the Complaint. The process server pushed the
paperwork under the garage door of Gillman's condo, which she noticed a couple of days
following the date notation in the service block of the Summons. {R. 9)
12

11

requesting that they be immediately removed. (R. Exhibit 12: 408:32-33, Affidavit of
Defendant)

19.

December S, 2011: Gillman petitioned the Court to nullify the wrongful lien on
the Salt Lake condo. (R. 17-31., Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien)

20.

11

December 6, 2011: 1-D amended" the Salt Lake condo lien by substituting the
legal description of the Herriman house-three months past the statutory
deadline, which had expired Sept. 8, 2011. (R. Exhibit 16)

Gillman's counsel

•

warned Gibbs that any amendment was well beyond the statutory deadline and
illegal. (R. 757-758:3-7, Declaration of Paul D. Dodd, Attorney For Defendant)
11

The

amendment" effected a voluntary release of the mechanic's lien on the Salt Lake

•

condo, but liened the Herriman house. 1-D released the lis pendens. (Exhibit 15)
21.

December 19, 2011: 1-D filed its First Amended Complaint, pleading the same
causes of action as its original, substituting the Herriman house for the Salt Lake
condo. {R. 76-87, First Amended Complaint)

22.

September 4, 2012: Gillman filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to
remove the Herriman house lien and dismiss the lien foreclosure cause of action.
{R. 143-152}

23.

September 28, 2012: Gillman submitted a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment for $1,000.
1-D never responded. (R. 758:8, Declaration of Paul D. Dodd, Attorney For Defendant)

24.

May 2, 2013: Judge Quinn ordered 1-D to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 243-244, Order to Show Cause)
12

•

25.

Judge Quinn granted Gillman's Motion for Partial Summary

July 8, 2013:

Judgment, dismissing the mechanic's lien and foreclosure cause of action on the

Herriman house, and finding the 1-D in violation of the Mechanic's Lien statute.
(R. 284-288, Order)

26.

February 7, 2014: The court ordered 1-D to show cause why the case should not

be dismissed for failure to prosecute the contract claim. Gillman was forced to
prematurely plead her attorney fees. (R. 294-295, Order to Show Cause: 296-348,
Defendant's Motion for Order Granting Attorney Fees and Costs)

27.

-+ June 2, 2014:

28.

-+ July 10, 2014: 1-D

Trial Judge, Richard McKelvie, was assigned the case. See Docket
launched its 'Gillman-fault' theme at the pre-trial conference,

which would re-litigate the lien issues at trial and overshadow the trial rulings.
{R. 581-582, Minutes; 967:1-970:9, Transcript)

29.

November 10, 2014: The bench trial was scheduled for one day. 1-D used the

day for its case-in-chief, taking two-thirds of the time. See Clerk's Index
30.

November 13, 2014: Trial reconvened at 2:00 p.m., concluding at approximately

4:50 p.m. Gillman presented her case in one hour, 30 minutes and 1-D crossexamined for one hour, 10 minutes. See Clerk's Index

31.

Post-Trial:
• November 21, 2014: Gillman written Closing Argument {R. 602-622}

1-D written Closing Argument (R. 625-644)
• January 29, 2015: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order {R. 647-658}
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•
• February 4, 2015: I-D's Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and Interest {R. 660673)

• February 12, 2015: Gillman's Rule 52 Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law (pied entitlement to attorney fees for defeating the

mechanic's liens) (R. 676-684)
• March 18, 2015: Ruling and Order on Motion to Amend (denying Gillman's

Rule 52 Motion) (R. 739-741)
• April 3, 2015: Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees
(R. 742-793}

• June 8, 2015: Order on Motion for Attorney Fees (R. 815-818}
• June 25, 2015: Gillman's Objection to Proposed Judgment (challenged pre-

judgment interest on attorney fees that 1-D did not plead) (R. 824-828)
• July 9, 2015: Order Denying Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order {R. 849850)

• July 9, 2015: Judgment (R. 851-853}
• July 15, 2015: I-D's Application for Amendment ofJudqment (R. 856-869}

•

• July 17, 2015: Judgment (ex-parte order, granting I-D's motion to increase

attorney fees by $5,481.27) (R. 874-876)
• August 10, 2015: Gillman's Notice of Appeal (R. 879-880}

Summary of Argument
I.

1-D filed two mechanic's liens, the first on Gillman's Salt Lake condo, the second

on her Herriman house. The liens were summarily disposed before trial and 1-D lost
both of them. Gillman held a statutory right to her attorney fees for defeating them.
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•

•
The mechanic's lien attorney fees would dominate the case, as 1-D sought to escape
€ii>

them, cultivating its 'Gillmanjault' theory:

The liens and their significant costs in

attorney fees were Gillman's fault, for which she should be punished. Starting with the
pre-trial hearing and extending through the trial, 1-D re-litigated the liens. The liens
were not relevant to the trial issues but the 'Gillman-fault' theory acutely prejudiced all
of the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
II.

Gillman had a statutory right to attorney fees for defeating both mechanic's liens.

However, the court adopted I-D's 'Gillman-fault' theory, denied Gillman her attorney
fees for defeating the liens and awarded 1-D its attorney fees for losing them. The court
erred in its interpretation of the Mechanic's Lien attorney fee statute in its award of
fees.
Ill.

The Salt Lake condo lien was filed under the authority of the Mechanic's Lien

statute, but did not satisfy any of the necessary criteria. A lien that purports to the
express authority of the Mechanic's Lien statute, but fails its criteria, can be found
wrongful under the Wrongful Lien statute, and is subject to penalties and attorney fees.
The Salt Lake condo lien was wrongful under the Wrongful Lien statute.
IV.

The only writing between 1-D and Gillman was a scant work order that included

no pricing. 1-D advocated only for an express contract at trial and the court's ruling
followed that advocacy, despite the absence of a price term. The law does not support
a conclusion of law that a contract is express without the essential price term. Though
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•
there was a contract, it was implied-in-fact, not express. I-D's trial burden for a contract
implied-in-fact was proof that its charges were the reasonable market value. I-D failed
that burden of proof.

Argument
I.

Mechanic's lien attorney fees dominated the case, not the underlying
contract claim. 1-D lost both liens summarily, but re-litigated the issue at
trial to escape statutory attorney fee liability for the losses.

I-D filed two mechanic's liens in the case, the first on the Salt Lake condo, the

•

second on the Herriman house. Time was the foundation of I-D's 'Gillman-fault' theory:
Gillman was responsible for the lien debacle and its costs because she did nothing to
correct I-D before it broke lien law, a premise that depended on the sequence of events:
•

March 11, 2011: I-D worked one day on the Herriman house.

•

June 15, 2011: I-D filed a lien on the Salt Lake condo, where it had never

worked.

-+ •

Sept. 8, 2011: The 180-day statutory deadline to file a lien expired.

•

Sept. 22, 2011: I-D filed suit to foreclose the Salt Lake condo lien.

•

Nov. 11, 2011: In a letter personally delivered, Gillman requested I-D remove
the condo lien.

•

Dec. 5, 2011: Gillman filed a Petition to Nullify the Salt Lake condo lien.

•

Dec. 6, 2011: I-D "amended" the condo lien and designated the Herriman

house.
•

July 8, 2013: Judge Quinn dismissed the Herriman lien on summary

judgment. Gillman's attorney fees exceeded $12,000.
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A. I-D's 'Gillman-fault' theory centered on the 180-day statutory time
limit to file a mechanic's lien under UCA §38-1-3 {Mechanics Lien
statute}.

Pivotal to the 'Gillman-fault' theory was the 180-day, statutory deadline

il

governing viability of the mechanic's lien on the Salt Lake condo, and whether Gillman
was duty-bound to prevent 1-D from violating the statutory limits of lien law.

1-D

asserted the theory at the pre-trial conference in July 2014, more than 18 months after
the condo lien was disposed and more than a year after Judge Quinn dismissed the
Herriman house lien on summary judgment: 13
GIBBS: [w]e filed a lawsuit to foreclose the mechanic's lien. We

served that on-on, on her then-attorney, it wasn't Mr. Stubbs, it
his law firm, it was Mr. Dodd. And they looked at it, they have it,
nobody gave any indication to either myself or my clients, wait a
second, this lien is on the wrong property.
Had they have done that, and I think that the history speaks for
itself, had they have done that, this issue would have been
resolved and the tail wouldn't be wagging the dog and we
wouldn't be here today in this scenario. (932:25-933:9}
-+COURT: You could have corrected it within the statutory time?
{R. 933:10)1 4

-+GIBBS: We could have corrected it and we did ... (R. 933:11)

II
II
During this hearing, Gibbs repeatedly referred to the Salt Lake condo as the "Sandy
property."
14The hearing transcript does not accurately include the last four words of this sentence. The
exact text of the court's question above is verbatim, and can be verified at 13.55.05. the time
stamp on the recording.
13
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GIBBS: And yes, Ms. Gillman did provide a letter to 1-D Electric and
the letter was purposely ambiguous, and it said, you put a lien on

my property," and, 1-1 won't read the entirety of the letter, but in
essence, what it said was, you put a lien on my property, this is

•

groundless, you need to remove it. (R. 936:23-937:2)
COURT: Did it identify the property on which the lien was(R. 937:3-4)

GIBBS: No, it did not. And it had her address for the Sandy (sic)
property right at the top of the letterhead. So 1-D Electric gets this
and they're, like, why is this a groundless lien, it has her Sandy (sic)
property listed on the top from her letterhead, doesn't say
anything about, hey, you liened my Sandy (sic) property, not the
Herriman property where the work was performed. Had that
have been the issue, the same thing would have happened that
happened immediately when they filed their petition to nullify the
wrongful lien, which is-that one has been corrected. (R. 937:5-14)

•

•

The reason they couldn't do that is because that was still within
the statutory timeframe to allow 1-D Electric to amend. If they
had given 1-D Electric notice that it was the wrong property being
referenced, an amendment could have been made to that
mechanic's lien and that amended mechanic's lien could have
been timely foreclosed. But the timing was such that it couldn't
be referenced, they couldn't let us know, despite the fact that she
had counsel and we were in communication, nothing was ever
referenced, because had there have been a reference, had there }
have been any notification, that lien could have been amended
timely, and this action would have been proceeding to foreclose
the Herriman property. (R. 937:15-938:1) (Emphasis added)

Gibbs' representations to the court were incendiary, but were not the truth. The
Mechanic's Lien statutory deadline to file or amend had expired Sept. 8, 2011. The

•

letter to which Gibbs refers was personally delivered by Gillman to 1-D on Nov. 11, 2011,
and identified the only mechanic's lien in place at the time, the Salt Lake condo lien.
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The letter was dated more than two months past the 180-day deadline. I-D "amended"
the Salt Lake condo lien to designate the Herriman house on Dec. 6, 2011-three
months too late.
The last mechanic's lien had been settled for at least a year before this pre-trial
date in July 2014 and was no longer relevant to the trial issues remaining, yet I-D
continued the steady drumbeat that Gillman was responsible for the lien misadventure
€ii)

and its costs because she did not correct I-D's lien before expiration of the statutory
deadline. Irrespective of its argument that Gillman was derelict of duty for failing to
legally protect I-D from violating the Mechanic's Lien statute, the 180-day deadline was

•

long past, expiring Sept. 8, 2011, as a matter of law.

B. Evidence at trial and the court's rulings centered on the 'Gillmanfau/t' theory.
The court entered numerous findings of fact that focused on the irrelevant
mechanic's liens, in the 'Gillman-fault' context:
1. Kim Olson, I-D's president, directed counsel to file the mechanic's lien because
"Defendant was trying to intimidate him ... " (R. 650:14, Findings of Fact)
2. Olson did not notice the lien was on the condo. (R. 651:15, Findings of Fact)
3. Gillman's Nov. 11, 2011 letter to Olson, requesting removal of the condo lien,
was "deliberately vague." {R. 651:16, Findings of Fact) The court drew the first tether of
connection between the mechanic's lien and Gillman's 'scheme' to convert it to a
wrongful lien:
19

[D]efendant knew that the lien had been placed on the wrong property
[a]nd intentionally and deliberately failed to mention that fact in the
letter to Olson [i]n a deliberate effort to establish a cause of action
against Plaintiff for filing a wrongful lien. (R. 651:17, Findings of Fact)
{Emphasis added)

4. Dec. 6, 2011 was Olson's realization that the condo had been liened and he
ordered it removed immediately. (R. 651:18, Findings of Fact)
5. Gillman testified she did not receive certified mail from 1-D because she was out
of town for long periods between March and mid-June 2011. (R. 654:28-29, Findings of

Notably, Defendant provided absolutely no evidence indicating the
dates she was gone, where she was, or the dates she was back in town.
The inference from her testimony is that she never received the
notices for the certified mail, is which she did not pick up from the post
office. Again, the court rejects her testimony. By all observations,
[D]efendant is a capable, accomplished business-woman who keeps
meticulous records and appears to retain everything.
Any
documentation of business travel would have been required for
business and tax purposes, and could have easily been provided to
the Court in support of her contention that she was gone for the
entirety of this critical period. The fact that she provided no such
testimony or documentation [l]eads the Court to conclude that her
avoidance of these letters was willful rather than circumstantial.
(R. 654:29, Findings of Fact) (Emphasis added}

This finding of the court underscores the intense focus on fixing Gillman's fault for not
discovering the condo lien and correcting 1-D before the Sept. 8th statutory deadline
expired-the "critical period." No discovery was ever conducted in this case. Trial was

15 Gillman

received the notices for the certified mail, which she produced at trial and submitted
into evidence during her testimony. (R. Exhibit 26, 1142:12-1143:15; 1147:24-1148:14;
1368:12-1371:5)
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the first and only time Gillman was ever questioned about her location during the

ei>

timeframe of the condo lien and foreclosure lawsuit filings. Yet, the court "rejects her
testimony," extrapolating to conclude that her failure to get the certified mail was
"willful rather than circumstantial." Gillman produced no travel records at trial because
nobody had ever asked for anything in discovery. Neither had anybody ever asked for
an accounting of her whereabouts. Further, the timeframe was only "critical" to the

€t

court if Gillman were responsible in some way for the condo lien.
6. The court placed categorical blame on Gillman for the mechanic's lien litigation
expenses, defending 1-D for filing them, then losing them:

•

Defendant argues that "approximately half of total attorney fees on
both sides of this case was spent asserting/defending the unlawful
lien claims that Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed or summarily lost."
Although Defendant correctly asserts that many of the fees
involved the litigation over the mechanic's lien, she is incorrect in
her assertion that those generated fees are the result of Plaintiff's
own actions. {R. 815-816:3, Order on Motion For Attorney Fees)
{Emphasis added)

•

7. This finding memorializes the re-trial of the irrelevant mechanic's liens, the court
belatedly deciding that the lien was not "unlawful," in direct contravention of the
summary disposal and Judge Quinn's ruling more than 18 months prior:

•

First, it must be noted that the Court determined that the lien was
not "unlawful." Although the lien was filed against the wrong
property, the Court determined that the errant filing was
inadvertent and was corrected immediately upon Plaintiff's counsel
learning of the error. Notwithstanding that correction, Defendant
insisted on pursuing a cause of action for wrongful lien, both
through motion for summary judgment and at trial.
The
21

mechanic's lien issue became the "tail wagging the dog" in this
case, and Defendant was relentless in her pursuit of it. (R. 816:5,
Order on Motion For Attorney Fees} (Emphasis added)

•

[t]he Court has previously determined that the driving force
behind this litigation was Defendant's intractable position that the
original charges for services were unreasonable, and her steadfast
determination to take advantage of an inadvertent clerical error
committed by Plaintiff's counsel. It is extremely doubtful that this

•

matter would have extended to a three-day trial 16 {or gone to trial
at all) over the initial claim based on work performed and not paid
for. Defendant made a strategic decision to take advantage of the
misplaced lien, not only as a means of avoiding the original debt,
but as a means of punishing Plaintiff for taking action against her.

•

(R. 816:8, Order on Motion For Attorney Fees) (Emphasis added)

The court's ruling was rigorously congruent to I-D's 'Gillman-fault' theory of the case.
Indeed, the mechanic's liens were the "tail wagging the dog," but the court imposed on
Gillman the fault, because she was "relentless in her pursuit of it."
The court erroneously reverses responsibility for the mechanic's liens. 1-D was
the perpetrator of the lien calamity and filed the liens, not Gillman. Gillman's counsel
warned 1-D that "amending" the Salt Lake condo lien to designate the Herriman house
was illegal and 1-D proceeded anyway-restarting the lien carnage with which these
courts are still grappling five years later.

This case could have been over, and should

have been over on Dec. 6, 2011, when 1-D 'discovered' its "error."

Rather than accept

responsibility, 1-D aggravated its "error" by "amending" the condo lien and reigniting
the litigation it would inevitably lose a second time.

trial did not extend to three days. 1-0 consumed the full day of trial on Nov. 10, 2014.
Gillman's case was heard Nov. 13, 2014, between 2:00 p.m. and 4:45 p.m.
16 The
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C. The illegality of the mechanic's liens on the Salt Lake condo and
the Herriman house was already settled. The mechanic's liens
were not relevant to the trial issues.

1-D could have appropriately appealed the loss of the mechanic's liens and did not,
instead choosing a surreptitious means of oblique attack-the 'Gillman-fault' theory.
Under no auspices of trial province should the mechanic's liens have been re-litigated,
but they were.
1-D successfully poisoned the water at the pre-trial hearing with the 'Gillman-

fault' theory of responsibility for the liens. The potency of this prejudicial dye would
prove devastating to the pure parameters of law in the case, coloring the whole trial and
its aftermath.

I-D's representations were not the truth, but they hit their mark.

Attorney fees were always the principal battle in the case. The court ultimately agreed
that 1-D was blameless for the mechanic's lien attorney fee debacle, Gillman was at
fault, and should be punished accordingly, that punishment taking the form of equitably
holding her responsible for the massive litigation expenses, including the mechanic's
liens, the wrongful lien, sua sponte, pre-judgment interest on attorney fees, and an ex-

parte Order that increased the initial judgment by $5,481.27.
II. Gillman was the successful party on both mechanic's lien claims and
foreclosure causes of action, defeating both the Salt Lake condo lien and the
Herriman house lien. Gillman is entitled to statutory attorney fees.
A. I-D's lien claim and foreclosure cause of action on Gillman's Salt Lake
condo failed by I-D's own admission, with a voluntary dismissal.
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Claiming authority under UCA §38-1-3 (Mechanics Lien statute), I-D filed a lien
against Gillman's Salt Lake condo June 15, 2011, then filed suit to foreclose the lien
Sept. 22, 2011, followed by a lis pendens on Nov. 2, 2011. (R. 1-8, Complaint; Exhibit 10:
15-16, Notice of Lis Pendens) The Salt Lake condo lien was not authorized by UCA §38-1-3

because I-D provided neither construction service nor materials, the necessary
prerequisites under the law. The related lis pendens was unlawful.
Gillman answered I-D's foreclosure complaint Dec. 5, 2011.
Answer and Counter Petition to Nullify)

{R. 17-31, Verified

•

On Dec. 6, 2011, I-D "amended" the Salt Lake

condo lien, essentially implementing a voluntary dismissal of the mechanic's lien and
second cause of action in the initial Complaint.

I-D released the lis pendens the same

day.
B. I-D's lien claim and foreclosure cause of action on Gillman's Herriman
house failed on a Summary Judgment Motion.

I-D's Dec. 6, 2011 "amendment" to the Salt Lake condo lien substituted the
Herriman house, again claiming authority under UCA §38-1-3, the Mechanics Lien
statute. (R. Exhibit 16)

The Herriman house lien was three months past the 180-day

statutory deadline, which had expired Sept. 8, 2011. On Dec. 19, 2011, I-D filed its First
Amended Complaint, designating the Herriman house in its second cause of action,

foreclosure of the mechanic's lien.

(R. 76-87}

Gillman filed a Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment, challenging the Herriman house lien under UCA §38-1-3 as

unlawful, I-D's claimed statutory authority. (R. 143-152}
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On July 8, 2013, Judge Quinn entered an order granting Gillman's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, dismissing the Herriman house lien, together with I-D's

second cause of action, foreclosure of that lien, and finding 1-D in violation of lien law.
(R. 284-288, Order)
C. 1-D claimed authority under UCA §38-1-3, the Mechanic's Lien statute,
for both the Salt Lake condo lien and the Herriman house lien. The
statute provides the right to attorney fees for the successful party,
§38-1-18.
UCA §38-1-18 is the mechanic's lien attorneys' fee statute, which states:

[i]n any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the

successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys'
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.
(Emphasis added)
This court has clearly delineated the meaning of "successful party," as it is
specified in the statute:

•

"[A] 'successful party [under Utah Code section 38-1-18] includes
one who successfully enforces or defends against a lien action. 111
Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 UT App 335, '19, 991 P.2d 1113 (Internal
citations omitted; emphasis added)
Applying the legislative intent of the mechanic's lien attorney fee statute, this
court has conveyed unequivocal guidance for awarding fees to the successful party:
[t] he provision mandates that the successful party be allowed to
recover reasonable attorney fees. . .[c]ourts do not have
discretion to decide whether to award reasonable attorney fees to
the "successful party." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v.
Guy, 2004 UT 47, '17, 94 P.3d 270
(Internal citations omitted;
emphasis added)
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I-D's voluntary dismissal of the Salt Lake condo lien does not relieve its liability
for Gillman's attorney fees, as the court clarified in this recent mechanic's lien case:
The fact that the [plaintiff] recognized the apparent weakness of its
claim and voluntarily dismissed it before the district court had an
opportunity to do [so] likewise does not relieve the [plaintiff] of its
obligation to reimburse the [defendants] for their attorney fees.
Any other rule would be fundamentally unfair to those
defendants who are required to incur substantial fees defending a
plaintiff's non-meritorious claims up to the point of the plaintiff's
voluntary dismissal. Lane Myers Constr., LLC v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., f/11, 2012 UT App 269 (Emphasis added)

•

•

•

D. The trial court's ruling on attorney fees does not conform to the Mechanic's
Lien statute or established precedent.

In its trial ruling, the court expressed its overall perspective on attorney fees,
relative to the outcome of the case, assimilating the 'Gillman-fault' theory in its
reasoning: 17
The Court has found against Defendant on the breach of contract
claim, and has similarly ruled against Defendant on her wrongful
lien claim. The Court has recognized no cause of action for which
Defendant may be entitled to fees.
[i]t is clear, and the court finds, that the expenses in this case, born
by both parties, have been exacerbated by Defendant's continued
and unreasonable efforts to avoid paying a contractual obligation,
and by attempting to use Plaintiff's harmless (and arguably
beneficial, to Defendant) error to create a wrongful lien cause of
action. It is therefore appropriate that Defendant bear the costs
of Plaintiff's fees as well as her own. (R. 657:43-658:44, Findings of

•

•

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order) (Emphasis added)

The trial court integrated its trial ruling, Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order (R.
647-658) with its Order On Motion For Attorney's Fees (R. 815-817). The two are inseparable in
the court's interrelated reasoning for awarding attorney fees.
17
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In response to the trial ruling, Gillman filed a Rule 52 Motion to Amend Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to reflect entitlement to attorney fees for successfully

defeating the two mechanic's liens and foreclosure causes of action, fully briefing the
court on the Mechanic's Lien attorney fee statute and relevant precedent. (R. 676-684}
The court denied Gill man's motion, without explanation. (R. 739-741, Ruling and Order on
Motion to Amend)

In its motion for attorney fees, 1-D did not segregate amounts between issues it
won and lost, though that may not have influenced the court's general appraisal of
attorney fee rights, which consolidated all issues beneath the 'Gillman-fault' canopy:
Plaintiff seeks fees in the amount of $29,144, and costs in the
amount of $465.32. Defendant argues that "approximately half of
total attorney fees on both sides of this case was spent
asserting/defending the unlawful lien claims that Plaintiff
voluntarily dismissed or summarily lost." Although Defendant
correctly asserts that many of the fees involved the litigation over
the mechanic's lien, she is incorrect in her assertion that those
generated fees are the result of Plaintiff's own actions. (R. 815816:4, Order on Motion For Attorney Fees) (Emphasis added)

First, it must be noted that the Court determined that the lien was
not "unlawful." Although the lien was filed against the wrong
property, the Court determined that the errant filing was
inadvertent and was corrected immediately upon Plaintiff's counsel
learning of the error. Notwithstanding that correction, Defendant
insisted on pursuing a cause of action for wrongful lien, both
through motion for summary judgment and at trial.
The
mechanic's lien issue became the "tail wagging the dog" in this
case, and Defendant was relentless in her pursuit of it. (R. 816:5,
Order on Motion For Attorney Fees) (Emphasis added)
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This irreconcilable tangle that combined the mechanic's liens with the wrongful
lien and contract claims was justification for penalizing Gillman with the attorney fees in
the case on an equitable analysis, weighing the composite of issues against each other
to reach an equilibrium among all of them for fixing relative "fault" across the horizon
of the whole case-that 'fault' lying squarely at Gillman's feet, because she was

•

"relentless in her pursuit of" the lien litigation that produced the immense attorney
fees.
This analytical methodology is not faithful to UCA §38-1-18, the Mechanic's Lien
attorney fee statute. There is no license in the precepts of this statute for an equitable
attorney fee interpretation. The mechanic's liens were not relevant at trial, and there is
no stretch of reasoning that can logically combine the mechanic's liens with the contract
and wrongful lien issues in the award of attorney fees. The trial court does not have
discretion in deciding whether to award attorney fees to the successful party defending
against a mechanic's lien; neither can the trial court bend the statute to an equitable
standard of evaluation for the award.
The mechanic's liens were discrete matters that were settled long before trial
and 1-D lost both of them. Gillman won summarily and decisively.

UCA §38-1-18 is

explicit and precedent is indisputable: Attorney fees are mandated for the successful
party and Gillman is entitled to them. The trial court erred in denying Gillman her fees
for successfully defending against the liens, and awarding 1-D its fees for losing them.
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Ill. The Salt Lake condo lien 1-D filed under authority of UCA §38-1-3, the
Mechanic's Lien statute, was wrongful under UCA §38-9-1, the Wrongful
Lien statute.

The trial court ruled
wrongful:

in its conclusion of law that the Salt Lake condo lien was not

[t]he lien here is not "wrongful" under the wrongful lien act. A lien
is not "wrongful" because it is inaccurate or misidentifies the
property it seeks to encumber. The lien is "authorized by statute"
which takes it out of the definition of a wrongful lien. As the
Hutter Court explained, a lien that is ultimately proved
unenforceable is not a wrongful lien by virtue of that fact alone.
(R. 657:39, Conclusions of Law)

A. 1-D violated the Mechanic's Lien statute, UCA §38-1-3, on the Salt
Lake condo lien.

1-D claimed to authority for the condo lien under the Mechanic's Lien statute,
UCA §38-1-3. (R. Exhibit 10)

However, 1-D never provided either service or materials to

the property, the requisite 'entitlement' criterion to satisfy the law. While the condo
lien purported to authority under the statute, it failed on its face, subjecting it to the
scrutiny of UCA §38-9-1, the Wrongful Lien statute.
B. 1-D violated the Wrongful Lien statute, UCA §38-9-1, on the Salt Lake
condo lien.

The Wrongful Lien statute, UCA §38-9-2(3), specifies that wrongful liens are those·
not expressly authorized by UCA §38-1-3, the Mechanic's Lien statute:
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under
Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1,
Mechanics Liens. (Emphasis added)
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The Wrongful Lien statute does not automatically prohibit any mechanic's lien
from being wrongful. It only prohibits a mechanic's lien filed by "a person entitled to a
lien" under the authority of UCA §38-1-3.
provision.

The distinction is in the 'entitlement'

If there is authority for entitlement to a lien under UCA §38-1-3, that lien

cannot be wrongful. However, a lien can be wrongful if it purports to qualify under the
entitlement provision of UCA §38-1-3, but does not have that authority.

The

'entitlement' provision resides in the solitary requirement that construction services be
provided on real property:
.. .a person who performs preconstruction service or construction
service on or for real property has a lien on the real property for
the reasonable value of the preconstruction service or construction
service .. (Emphasis added)

I-D's lien on the condo failed the first precondition of the Mechanic's Lien
statute. Failing 'entitlement' was fatal from the outset under UCA §38-9-1, and the
definitions specify the bases for a wrongful lien and set the timeframe for their
evaluation:
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a
lien, notice of interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in
certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal
statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or iudgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the
owner of the real property. (Emphasis added)
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The statute is clear that interpretation of "wrongful" does not extend beyond the
face of the lien document itself, "at the time it is recorded." I-D's Notice of Mechanic's
Lien on the condo claimed authority under UCA §38-1-3, but satisfied none of its

conditions in any particular, relegating it to a wrongful lien under UCA §38-9-1 for that
reason-it was not legitimate on its face.
The appellate benches have taken considerable notice of the confusion that has
arisen in interpreting the Wrongful Lien statute, consistently advancing the articulation
of exactly why a property lien, claimed under authority of the Mechanic's Lien statute,
UCA §38-1-3, can be found wrongful under UCA §38-9-1, the Wrongful Lien statute.

Beginning in 2008, the Court of Appeals published dicta on the cohesion:
The Wrongful Lien statute declares: This chapter does not apply to
a person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who files a lien
pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. Thus, the statute
is not so broad as to exempt any filing that purports to arise under
the mechanics' lien statute.
Instead, section 38-9-2(3) only
excludes persons "entitled" to a mechanics' lien. Foothill Park, LC
v. Judston, Inc., UT App. 113, f[19, 182 P.3d 924 (2008) (Internal
quotations, citations omitted; emphasis added)
The Supreme Court decided Hutter v. Dig-It in 2009. The contractor followed the
Mechanic's Lien statute perfectly when filing its lien against the Hutters, but then did
not follow the rules of the state construction registry. The lien was valid under the
statutory authority of UCA §38-1-3, but unenforceable for its failure under construction
registry rules. The Hutters pied the lien as wrongful because it was unenforceable and
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•
the trial court agreed. The Supreme Court disagreed, identifying these core terms:
•
•
•

expressly authorized by statute
unenforceable
wrongful

Therefore, we conclude that the phrase "not expressly authorized
by [s]tatute" in the Wrongful Lien Act does not include statutorily
created liens that ultimately prove unenforceable. Because Dig-It
filed a mechanic's lien, which is expressly authorized by statute,
the lien, though unenforceable for the reasons stated above, is not
wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Injunction Act. Hutter v. Dig-It,
2009 UT 69, f/52, 219 P.3d 918 (Emphasis added)

•

•

When Dig-It filed the lien against the Hutters, the lien document followed the
criteria governing its creation under the Mechanic's Lien statute.

Hence, it was

"expressly authorized by statute." Thereafter, Dig-It lost enforcement capacity of the
lien for not following the state construction registry rules. Losing enforcement capacity
did not change the statutory authority underlying creation of the lien. The lien was still
"expressly authorized by statute," but was now "unenforceable." Did that make the lien
"wrongful"? The Supreme Court's answer was, "No." The Supreme Court's explanation
drew together in this dictum, the relationship between the core terms and "wrongful":
A lien cannot be "wrongful" if it is "expressly authorized by statute." That "express"
authority is molded by following the exact criteria of statute when the lien is created.
Once extant, "express" authority cannot be eradicated, even If the lien proves
unenforceable for other reasons.

Liens created under "express" statutory authority

cannot be wrongful. However, liens created without "express" statutory authority can
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be wrongful. 'Failing authority' and 'failing enforcement' are two distinctly different
concepts. 'Failing authority' can be wrongful. 'Failing enforcement' cannot. The Hutter
lien failed enforcement, not authority. It was not wrongful.
In June 2014, the appellate court distinguished that holding in Bay Harbor LC v.
Sumsion.

If a lien claimant has no plausible claim to the property that is liened, the

Court may declare the lien wrongful under the Wrongful Lien statute, even if it purports

<i>

to fall into the category of a statutory lien, but fails express authority (quoted in part):
This is not to say that a lien claimant may escape the reach of the
Wrongful Lien Act simply by alleging that his or her lien is 11 expressly
authorized by statute." See Hutter, 2009 UT 69, fl 52, 219 P.3d 918.
.. . [i]f a lien claimant has no plausible claim to the property that is
the subiect of the lien, a court may declare the lien wrongful
under the Wrongful Lien Act even if it purports to be one falling
into the category of statutorily authorized liens. Bay Harbor Farm,
LC v. Sumsion, 2014 UT App 133, 329, f/12, P.3d (Emphasis added)

(I

This holding was reconfirmed October 30, 2014 in Total Restoration, Inc. v.
Merritt, a decision through which the appellate court gave this guidance (quoted in

part):
[w]e also address Total Restoration's argument that because
mechanics' liens are authorized by statute, "mechanics' liens,
without exception, are never wrongful liens."
[l]f the claimant has no plausible basis for recording a statutory
lien, a court may declare the lien wrongful under the Wrongful
Lien Act even if it purports to be one falling into the category of
statutorily authorized liens. Total Restoration, Inc. v. Merritt, 338,
f/18, P.3d 836, 841 (Utah App. 2014) (Internal citations omitted;
emphasis added)
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I-D's Notice of Lien on the Salt Lake condo was wrongful on its face. The lien
purported to authority under UCA §38-1-3, the Mechanic's Lien statute, but followed
none of its criteria. The condo lien 'failed authority'. 1-D never had a statutory right to
this lien and no plausible basis for filing it. The direction of the appellate benches is that
such a lien can be found wrongful under UCA §38-9-1, the Wrongful Lien statute.
UCA §38-9-4 formulates the liability for filing a wrongful lien, and

calculates the damages due the aggrieved property owner (Emphasis added):
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as
defined in Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of
the county recorder against real property is liable to a record
interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused by
the wrongful lien.

(2) If the person in violation of Subsection (1) refuses to release or
correct the wrongful lien within ten days from the date of
written request from a record interest holder of the real
property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known
address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record
interest holder for $3,000 or for treble actual damages,
whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and
costs.
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for
$10,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and
for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who records or files or
causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in
Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the
real property, knowing or having reason to know that the
document:

(a) is a wrongful lien;
(b) is groundless; or
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim.
34

•

The Salt Lake condo lien failed authority under the statue. When I-D filed, it
@

unquestionably knew, or should have known, that it was wrongful, or groundless, or
contained a material misstatement or false claim. I-D had to know that it never worked
on the Salt Lake condo and had no right to file a lien under the "express" authority of
the statute.
On Nov. 11, 2011, Defendant personally delivered to I-D, written notice that the
lien and lis pendens were legally baseless, requesting that both be removed from the
property. I-D did not remove either before the 10-day time limit.
There are two tiers to the statutory penalties of UCA §38-9-4. The lesser penalty
of $3,000 depends on whether the property owner provided written notice to the lien
claimant, requesting removal of the lien-notice that Gillman personally delivered to I-D
on Nov. 11, 2011. I-D did not remove the lien until Dec. 6, 2011, almost a month later.
By clear, black-letter law, I-D is liable for at least the $3,000 penalty.
The greater penalty of $10,000 is assessed against the lien claimant if the lien is
wrongful, or groundless, or contains a material misstatement or false claim. Only one of
these statutory conditions is necessary to justify the penalty. I-D's Notice of Lien, on its
face at the time it was recorded, met all three, justifying the $10,000 statutory penalty.
Both penalty tiers provide entitlement to attorney fees.
The court's findings and conclusions on the wrongful lien issue centered in the

'Gillman-fault' theory, not the principles of statute or precedent. The court judged
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Gillman's Nov. 11, 2011 letter to 1-D, which conformed exactly to UCA §38-9-4(2), as a
carefully calculated conspiracy that created the wrongful lien:
[D]efendant knew that the lien had been placed on the wrong
property [a]nd intentionally and deliberately failed to mention that
fact in the letter to Olson [i]n a deliberate effort to establish a
cause of action against Plaintiff for filing a wrongful lien. (R. 651:17,
Findings of Fact) {Emphasis added)

Gillman knew there was a lien on the condo.

However, no reading of the

statutory scheme can be construed to a conclusion of law that the property owner
aggrieved by a mechanic's lien can convert that lien to "wrongful."

Only the lien

claimant has control of whether a lien is wrongful or not-control that is asserted when
the lien is created, at the time it is recorded. 1-D initiated the wrongful lien on the Salt
Lake condo when it filed a lien that 'failed authority' under the Mechanic's Lien statute.
The

court's

censure

of

Gillman

was

tainted

with

the

common

statutory/enforcement confusion that frequently intermingles in the analysis of
wrongful liens:
[r]ealizing Plaintiffs error in filing the lien, Defendant made a
determined effort to capitalize on that error to her advantage.
Clearly, Defendant suffered no harm from the misplaced lien, and
her "lying in wait" strategy had at least one positive effect . . .It
made the lien unenforceable, and the delay created a legal
impediment to Plaintiff's filing of a subsequent lien on the correct
property. (R. 657:41, Conclusions of Law) (Emphasis added)

The court does not recognize that the Salt Lake condo lien failed the "express"
authority of the Mechanic's Lien statute from the outset.
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Without authority,

•

"enforcement" of the condo lien could never become an issue. Casting the facts into a
•

complicit, "lying in wait" framework, the court chastises Gillman for a "delay" that
"created a legal impediment" preventing I-D from "filing of a subsequent lien on the
correct property." Once again overlapping the unrelated facts of the Herriman lien and
the condo lien, within the 'Gillman-fault' theory, the court upbraids Gillman for failing to
correct I-D before it broke lien law. Gillman never persuaded the court that it was not
her legal responsibility to protect I-D from itself. Neither did the court ever grasp that
even if it were, the reality of statute made intercession hopeless:

The 180-day

statutory deadline expired Sept. 8th , as a matter of law, two months before the Nov. 11th
letter.
The court's ruling went further in its criticism of Gillman for 'trapping' I-D into a
wrongful lien, introducing obligations that are neither contained within, nor plausibly
inferred from, the statute:
[D]efendant knew or reasonably should have known that any such
letter authored or signed by her counsel and directed to Plaintiff's
counsel, would by ethical standards be required to contain more
particularity regarding the factual or legal inadequacies of the
mechanic's lien.
[i]t becomes even more clear that it was
intentionally vague in an attempt to lay a trap for improper or
wrongful lien. (R. 655:32, Conclusions of Law) (Emphasis added)
Whether Gillman educated I-D to the "legal inadequacies of the mechanic's lien"
could not have made any difference to its validity. The statute had been expired for two
•

months. Neither was it possible for Gillman to "trap" I-D into a wrongful lien on the
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condo. 1-D achieved that independently when it filed the lien June 15 th without express
authority.
Parallel to I-D's 'Gillman-fault' contentions, the court leveled charges of ethical
misconduct, as further verification that Gillman sought to "set up" a wrongful lien:
Defendant is admittedly trained in the law [H]er suggestion that
she and her counsel determined that in order to be effective the
letter would have to be delivered directly by her to Plaintiff is not
only an invalid legal conclusion, it is an improper one. She and her
counsel both knew that Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and
presumably her counsel knew, if she did not, that direct
communication with a represented party in (sic) a violation of the
Canons of Ethics. The Court finds that Defendant's decision to
deliver the letter personally, whether on advice of counsel or not,
was a deliberate attempt to obscure the reason she believed the
lien was improper, and thereby set up a claim of wrongful lien.
(R. 655:32, Findings of Fact) (Emphasis added)

This ethical principle has already been precisely treated by this court in a
wrongful lien case. Plaintiff, Centennial, was the (LLC entity) lienholder. The property

•

owner, Vanessa, delivered notice to Centennial's counsel, initiating debate on the bench
for whether this departure from statutory edict conformed to the law:

Vanessa argues that requiring the request to remove the lien to be
delivered directly to Centennial would violate rule 4.2(a) of the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. See Utah R. Prof'I Conduct
4.2(a). On the contrary, a decision that the notice is invalid would
comport with rule 4.2(a), which states:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has
the consent of the other lawyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an
attorney may, without such prior consent, communicate with
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another's client if authorized to do so by any law, rule, or court
order ....
Id. (emphasis added). Rule 4.2(a) expressly provides that a lawyer
may communicate with a party if authorized to do so by law. The
wrongful lien statute's requirement that a request for release of a
lien be delivered personally to the lien claimant specifically
authorizes such a communication between a lawyer and a party.
As such, rule 4.2 is not an ethical impediment to compliance with
the notice provisions of the wrongful lien statute. Centennial Inv.
Co., LLC v. Nuttall, UT App 321, 1121, 171 P.3d 458 (Emphasis
original)

Gillman's notice to 1-D conformed to the statutory requirement that delivery be
accomplished directly between property owner and lien claimant, which did not violate
any rule of professional conduct, and certainly did not "set up" the wrongful lien.
Lost in this overwhelming preoccupation with 'Gillman-fault' were the grounding
principles of mechanic's lien law and wrongful lien law.

1-D never had statutory

entitlement to a lien on the Salt Lake condo, which was clear on the face of the lien
document the day it was recorded.
Ci>

The lien was wrongful on its face for 'failing

authority'. Gillman requested removal of the lien, which 1-D did not accomplish within
the 10-day statutory time, subjecting itself to the first tier of legislated penalty. 1-D
knew, or should have known, that the lien was wrongful, or groundless, or contained a
material misstatement or false claim. In fact, the lien was wrongful, and groundless,
and contained a material misstatement or false claim, subjecting 1-D to the second tier

of legislated penalty. The law authorizes both penalty tiers and attorney fees to Gillman
for the wrongful lien on the Salt Lake condo.
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IV. 1-D failed its contract burden of proof.
A. The trial court's conclusion of law, that there was an express
contract between 1-D and Gillman, was erroneous.

At trial, 1-D advocated only for an express contract, which the court adopted in its
conclusions of law:

•

Plaintiff claims, and the Court finds, that there was a binding
contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. The necessary elements
are present. (R. 655:33, Conclusions of Law) (Emphasis added}
There is clearly a meeting of the minds. Plaintiff expected to be
paid for the work and materials provided, and Defendant clearly
expected to pay. Although the exact costs and work were not
confirmed at the outset, Defendant was well-versed in
construction contracts, and knew to expect that she would be
billed for both supplies and labor. The fact that she expressed
dissatisfaction about the amount billed does not diminish the fact
that she undertook a responsibility to pay. Moreover, she signed
the work order, which had been substantially completed (albeit
without prices) at the time. (R. 655-656:34, Conclusions of Law)
(Emphasis added)

Consistent with its ruling that the contract was express, the court awarded 1-D its
full charges of $1,827.61 in damages, together with 24% in pre-judgment interest, for a
total of $3,393.09.

B. Without a price term, there was no express contract.
While the court specifically recognized that there was no agreement for price, it
nevertheless concluded there was a "meeting of the minds" forming a binding contract.
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This conclusion of law does not align with the long history of contract precedent in
i)

Utah:
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that
there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient
definiteness to be enforced. Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362
P.2d 427, 428 /1961) (Emphasis added)

•

[A] meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement
is essential to the formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be
enforced if its terms are indefinite. Nielsen v. Gold's Gvm, 2003 UT
37, f/11, 78 P.3d 600 (Emphasis added)

@

The crux of this contract dispute was the price. There was never agreement for a
•

price, a conclusion the court also included in its ruling. Without that agreement, there
was no price term to enforce and the court erred in selecting I-D's arbitrary calculation
of charges as the proxy term for a binding contract.
C. I-D's sole contractual claim lay in quantum meruit.

In its First Amended Complaint, 1-D pied three causes of action:
•
•
•

Breach of contract
Lien foreclosure
Quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, and/or quantum meruit

1-D clearly contemplated that the alternative to a "price," under a binding
11

contract was the "reasonable" amount equal to the value" of the services in quantum
meruit:
If for any reason the trier-of-fact in this case fails to identify the
existence of an enforceable and binding contract [P]laintiff asserts
an alternative claim for quasi contract, unjust enrichment and/or
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quantum meruit.

(R. 81:25, First Amended Complaint) {Emphasis

added)

Plaintiff performed electrical services for Gillman and thereby
conferred a benefit upon Gillman with a reasonable expectation of
being compensated in an amount equal to the value of such
services. (R. 81:24, First Amended Complaint) {Emphasis added)
Olson testified that the I-D charges were "a lot of money." (R. 1190:23} But he
said, "[t]he bill I thought was already fair and reasonable." (R. 1218:7-8)
Gillman tried many times to settle this dispute without protracted litigation and
has always acknowledged that she owes the reasonable value of I-D's services, a fact
substantiated by the:
•
•

•

•

Answer to First Amended Complaint {R. 127:12)
Remittance copy of I-D's March 24th invoice that Gillman mailed
back to I-D, asking for the labor allocation (R. Exhibit 4, p. 2}
May 6, 2011 letter to 1-D that ended with Gillman's offer that she
was "willing to pay a realistic amount for the work that was done,
but no more. Please recalculate it." (R. Exhibit 6, p. 2}
Repeated trial testimony {1168:3-9; 1169:1-13; 1367:2-9; 1372:241374:10; 1399:16-19}

Without an express contract, I-D's contract alternative was quantum meruit.
There has never been a dispute that I-D provided services, or that Gillman expected to
pay for them. The only dispute was the reasonable amount due. The seminal case in
Utah on the doctrine of quantum meruit is Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
Davies is very similar to this case.

Davies built duplexes for the defendants,

Olson, et al. Olson requested the services. Davies and Olson agreed the duplexes would
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~

be constructed for cost, plus $6,000 profit/each. A written contract was prepared, but
~

never signed. When one of the duplexes sold, the price did not satisfy the outstanding
construction loan and litigation began to recover the difference. In adjudicating that
difference, the trial court found no meeting of the minds on price; hence, there was no
contract.
On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's finding of no enforceable contract,

8

for lack of a price term. The court took occasion to clarify quantum meruit, dividing the
principal into two branches (quoted in part):

•

[c]onfusion surrounds the use and application of quantum meruit
because courts have used the term quantum meruit, contract
implied in fact, contract implied in law, quasi contract, unjust
enrichment, and/or restitution without analytical precision. Id. at
268 [Citations omitted]
Contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract or unjust
enrichment, is one branch of quantum meruit. A quasi-contract is
not a contract at all, but rather is a legal action in restitution. Id. at
269 [Citations omitted]
A contract implied in fact is the second branch of quantum meruit.
A contract implied in fact is a "contract" established by conduct.
The elements of a contract implied in fact are: (1) the defendant
requested the plaintiff to perform work; (2) the plaintiff expected
the defendant to compensate him or her for those services; and (3)
the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff
expected compensation. Id. [Citation omitted]
Technically, recovery in contract implied in fact is the amount the
parties intended as the contract price. If that amount is
unexpressed, courts will infer that the parties intended the
amount to be the reasonable market value of the plaintiff's
services. Id. [Citation omitted; emphasis added]
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I-D's sole remedy was quantum meruit, under a contract implied-in-fact that
lacked agreement on price. Gillman requested the work, expected to pay for it, and 1-D
expected to be paid. Inasmuch as the price was never agreed, the court must infer the
amount was the reasonable market value of I-D's work.
D. 1-D had the burden of proof for establishing the reasonable market
value of the material and service it provided.

Corresponding to the Davies facts, 1-D did not have an express contract with a
price term. 1-D provided material and service. Gillman accepted the benefits and has
admitted throughout that she is obligated to pay their reasonable value.

The burden of

proof for value is upon the party asserting quantum meruit. See Zitterkopf v. Bradbury,
783 P.2d 1142 (Wyo. 1989); Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1160 (Wyo. 1982).
E. 1-D did not prove the reasonable market value of its charges.

The court succinctly summarized the substance of evidence 1-D presented to
prove its express contract case:
Plaintiff substantially performed the terms of the contract. [the]
Court found that the electricians provided by Plaintiff were
continuously and properly engaged in the work for which they
were employed. [D]efendant engaged the services of trained
electricians, and had to know that they would be compensated the
same amount (as Olson testified) for changing a light bulb as for
replacing a circuit box or performing some other sophisticated
procedure. (R. 656:35, Conclusions of Law) (Emphasis added)
Whether the crew was "continuously and properly engaged" does not translate
to a computation for the reasonable market value of what was accomplished all day. 1-D
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did not make that translation, and the court profoundly begs that salient question in its
assumption that Gillman "had to know that they would be compensated the same
amount [f]or changing a light bulb as for replacing a circuit box or performing some
other sophisticated procedure." Indeed, Gillman did not know-the very reason the law
requires reasonable market reconciliation of a demand for payment at an excessive
price that was never agreed: No reasonable person hires a crew of three professional
electricians to change light bulbs at $165/hr. 18 Gillman does not dispute the court's
account of I-D's evidence, that the crew was "continuously and properly engaged." It is a
fair and comprehensive synopsis of I-D's "proof." However, it was I-D's burden to prove
that the $1,827.61 it charged for being "continuously and properly engaged" was the

reasonable market value of the work. 1-D did not do it.
F. The only evidence in the record for the reasonable market value
of I-D's services is between $600 and $700, evidence adduced at
trial by 1-D.

1-D bore the burden of proving the basis of their complaint-quantum meruit, or
the reasonable market value of the services provided to Gillman. The only evidence
adduced at trial was derived during I-D's case-in-chief in its examination of Gillman. To
Plaintiff's direct question of the reasonable value for its services, Gillman testified that
she sought the opinions of two other electricians for an assessment of I-D's work, one of
which was $600, the other was $700. {R. 1137:6-1138:2; 1372:4-23} As a comparative

1-D charged the journeyman electrician @ $65/hr.; the other two were each billed @ $50/hr.,
totaling $165/hr. (R. Exhibit 2)
18
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ratio, Gillman also testified that she engaged another electrician to complete moving
the garage attic wires that 1-D did not finish in preparation for the flooring, as well as
everything else remaining inside the house. She paid $650 (labor only) for everything,
which she evaluated as five times more work than 1-D accomplished.

(R. 1372:4-23;

406:21, Affidavit of Defendant) Though 1-D had ample opportunity during trial, taking two-

thirds of the time, Gillman's was the only testimony, which 1-D presented to the Court,
regarding the reasonable market value of I-D's services, and was between $600 and
$700.
The court erred in its conclusion of law that there was an express contract. I-D's
basis of recovery was an implied-in-fact contract in quantum meruit, as this court
explained in Davies, and 1-D identified as an alternative in its First Amended Complaint.
(R. 81:25).

The trial record can only devolve to the evidence available-Gillman's

testimony that two independent electricians determined the reasonable market value
was between $600 and $700.
G. Gillman should be awarded her trial attorney fees, for I-D's failure to
meet its burden of proof.

1. The court awarded 1-D all of its trial attorney fees.
I-D's work order includes a provision to recover attorney fees in any collection
action for its charges: "Purchaser agrees to pay all costs and expenses including
reasonable attorney's fees in the event collection becomes necessary." (R. Exhibit 2)
The court was authorized to award attorney fees:
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Where the parties have agreed by contract to the payment of
attorney fees, the court may award reasonable fees in accordance
with the terms of the parties' agreement. Trayner v. Cushing, 688
P.2d, 858 (Utah 1984)
The court invited 1-D to apply for attorney fees, then awarded 1-D all of its trial
attorney fees, and approximately 75% of its pre-trial fees-all of which was expended in
the lien battle.
The Court has determined that Plaintiff prevails in its breach of
contract claim. The contract itself has a provision for attorney's
fees. In its written argument, Plaintiff has not claimed an amount
for attorney fees, but has not waived the right to do so. The Court
finds that Plaintiff may be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in
this matter, and directs Plaintiff to submit a proposed order
regarding attorney's fees. (R. 657:42, Conclusions of Law) {Emphasis
added)

Gillman filed a Rule 52 motion, pleading the court award her attorney fees for
defeating the mechanic's liens, which the court denied. {R. 676-684, Rule 52 Motion to
Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; R. 739-741, Ruling and Order on Motion to
Amend).

Gillman objected to I-D's motion for fees, which did not segregate fees for

issues won or lost, and addressed none of the "reasonableness" factors of precedent.
{R. 742-793, Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees) I-D's motion for

fees did no more than outline claimed fees and interest, with billing records appended.
{R. 660-673, Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and Interest)

The court entered no findings,

beyond the reiteration that Gillman was at fault for the total of the litigation expenses,
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"the lien was not 'unlawful,"' 19 and Gillman tried to manipulate the mechanic's lien to
create a wrongful lien cause of action:
Moreover, it is clear, and the court finds, that the expenses in this
case, born by both parties, have been exacerbated by Defendant's
continued and unreasonable efforts to avoid paying a contractual
obligation, and by attempting to use Plaintiff's harmless (and
arguably beneficial, to Defendant) error to create a wrongful lien
cause of action. It is therefore appropriate that Defendant bear
the costs of Plaintiff's fees as well as her own. (R. 815:3, Order On
Motion For Attorney Fees) (Emphasis added)

The court awarded 1-D over $25,997 for attorney fees and costs, with interest at
24%. (R. 817:10-12, Order On Motion For Attorney Fees)

Sua sponte, and over Gillman's

objection, the court's Judgment awarded 1-D pre-judgment interest on attorney fees. (R.
851-853, Judgment)

Thereafter, the court entered an ex parte order, awarding 1-D

additional attorney fees of $5,481.27, raising the total judgment to $36,939.29. (R. 874876, Judgment)

2. The Reciprocal Fee statute, UCA §788-5-826, gives the court
discretion to award attorney fees and costs.

Utah's Reciprocal Fee statute, UCA §788-5-826, is specific to its intent for
extending attorney fee rights to all parties under a contract:
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that
prevails in a civil action based upon any [w]ritten contract, or other
writing, [w]hen the provisions of the [c]ontract [a]llow at least one
party to recover attorney fees.

19 (R.

816:5, Order On Motion For Attorney Fees)
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The court exercised that discretion in this case, granting 1-D all of the fees, costs

iJ

and interest it pied, pre-judgment interest it did not plead that was unsupported by law,
and fees the court ordered ex parte.
3. UCA §788-5-826 is intended to equalize litigation risks.

Noting the dearth of direction in the language of the statute, the courts have
steered its application toward honoring the underlying policy its enactment was meant
GI

to promote, that policy taking the shape of equally allocating the litigation "risk,"
against the one-sided reality that the enforcement party enjoys "significant bargaining
advantage."
The reciprocal attorney fee statute provides no guidance as to
when fees should be awarded .. . [d]istrict courts should look to
the policies underlying the statute in exercising this discretion.
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, f/17, 160 P.3d 1041. (Internal
citations omitted; emphasis added)
The statute levels the playing field by allowing both parties to
recover fees, [r]emedying the unequal allocation of litigation risks
built into many contracts of adhesion. In addition, this statute
rectifies the inequitable common law result where a party that
seeks to enforce a contract containing an attorney fees clause has
a significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to
invalidate the contract. Id. at '118 (Internal citations omitted;
emphasis added)
[u]se of the word "may" also indicates that courts have broad
discretion in applying equitable principles in fixing the amount of
any award of fees under the statute. Id. at '121 (Emphasis added)
1-D held the "significant bargaining advantage" over Gillman, that advantage
forged from I-D's unwavering insistence that the contract was express, and demanding
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collection of its full charges. Along the way, 1-D ran up a colossal sum of attorney fees,
choosing a litigation strategy that utilized liens it would lose, long before trial.

1-D

refused to settle before trial, unless Gillman relinquished her statutory rights to
attorney fees for defeating the mechanic's liens. Gillman's sole recourse in the standoff
was the intercession of the law-intercession that could not be achieved without trial.
Within the 'Gillman-faulf theory, the court re-litigated those liens, then in its
"discretion," awarded 1-D attorney fees for losing them, together with all of I-D's trial
attorney fees, even though the contract failed its burden of proof. 20
4. UCA §788-5-826 is hypothetical in its application.

The courts characterize reciprocity as exclusively hypothetical in the nature of its
operational purpose, to level the playing field and equalize the litigation risks among
parties to contracts, protecting a single standard, not promoting a double standard:
The classic application of the statute involves a one-sided fee
provision in a dispute between the parties to the contract. And in
that archetypal scenario, the statutory analysis of whether the
contract allows "at least one party to recover" is undertaken in
the hypothetical-under an alternative consideration in which the
tables were turned and the opposite party prevailed. Because only
that approach preserves the classic case covered by the statute,
we interpret its language to contemplate the hypothetical analysis.
Hooban v. Unicity Int'/, Inc., 2009 UT App 287, f/26, 220 P.3d 485,
aff'd, 2012 UT 40, 285 P.3d 766 (Emphasis added)

°

Closing arguments were submitted in writing. Gillman thoroughly briefed the court on the
principles of express contract, quantum meruit, their respective burdens of proof, and I-D's
failure of its burden. The court was fully advised before ruling and overtly rejected the Davies
dicta in its decision that the contract was express, rather than implied-in-fact. (R. 602-622,

2

Written Closing Argument of Defendant)
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5. Gillman is due her trial attorney fees under the Reciprocal Fee statute,
and should be awarded her attorney fees on appeal.

Had the court not erred in its conclusion of law that there was a binding contract,
and entered the correct conclusion that the contract was implied-in-fact, I-D would have
lost the trial outcome for its failure to meet the burden of proof to establish it charges
were a reasonable market value. Under that hypothetical scenario, the tables would
have turned and Gillman would have recovered her trial attorney fees. In the exercise
of its "discretion," the court awarded I-D all of its trial fees with no inquiry past a scant
Affidavit and billing records.

In the hypothetical equation of the statute's intent,

reciprocity dictates Gillman be treated identically in recovering all of her trial fees.
Anything less would not preserve the integrity of justice that is the Reciprocal Fee

<i

statute's policy intent.

The same standard of the court's discretion for I-D's fee

calculation should be duplicated for Gillman's fees.
Gillman should be awarded her attorney fees for this appeal. See Va/carce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998)

Conclusion

This simple contract case over a disputed invoice for electrical services totaling
$1,827.61, exploded into an epic conflict over attorney fees that approximate
$100,000-the result of mechanic's liens I-D lost pre-trial, but has refused to concede.
Re-litigated at trial, the liens jaundiced the court's rulings with the prejudice of I-D's
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'Gillman-fault' theory. The court adopted that theory, assessing Gillman the fees of
litigation, which included I-D's lien losses.
The court erred in its denial of Gillman's statutory attorney fees for defeating the
liens; erred in ruling that the Salt Lake condo lien was not wrongful; and, erred in ruling
that I-D's contract was express, when it had no price. I-D's basis of contract recovery
was in quantum meruit, which carried a burden of proof for establishing the reasonable
market value of its charges. 1-D failed that burden of proof. The only evidence in the
record for the reasonable market value was adduced at trial by 1-D in its direct
examination of Gillman, and is between $600 and $700.

1-D had its day in court.

Reasonable market valuation between $600 and $700 is the only evidence it presented
in quantum meruit.
This court should:
1.

Reverse the trial court and award Gillman's statutory attorney fees for
successfully defeating the two mechanic's liens.

2.

Reverse the trial court's ruling that the Salt Lake condo lien was not
wrongful, and award Gillman both tiers of statutory penalties and attorney
fees.

3.

Reverse the trial court's conclusion of law that the contract was express,
rather than implied-in-fact, and direct that:
a.

The contract burden of proof is the reasonable market value of I-D's
services, which is between $600 and $700-the only evidence in
the trial record.
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b.

Gillman be awarded all of her trial attorney fees under the
Reciprocal Fee statute, on the same discretionary basis the trial
court utilized to award 1-D all of its trial attorney fees.

4.

Award Gillman her attorney fees for this appeal.

DATED this 15 th day of February 2016.

FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICI~~IS'FRI~T ~O
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF WAH . ,:> ., .
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I-D ELECTRIC, INC.,
Plaintiff,
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~~

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

V.

LINDA T. GILMAN,
Defendant.

Case No. 110917777
Judge RICHARD D. McKELVIE
DATE: January 20, 2015

This matter crune before the Court for trial November 10-13, 2014. The parties thereafter
submitted written closing arguments. The Court, having reviewed the testimony and exhibits
entered at trial, and having considered the arguments of coW1sel, enters these findings pursuant to
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT

Following is a list of the witnesses testifying at trial, together with a synopsis of their
testimony, and (where appropriate) specific findings regarding the adoption or rejection by the
Court of their testimony.
A. Chet Hunter
1 · Chet Hunter testified that he is a journeyman electrician who has been employed by
Plaintiff since 1998. On March 10, 2011, Hunter was at an electrical wholesale supply picking
up supplies when he was approached by Defendant, whom he had not met previously.
Defendant asked Hunter if he was an electrician, and when he responded in the affomative, she
told him she wanted to hire him to do some work on a house, and asked her to follow him to the
residence. 1
1 Defendant testified that she did not request that Hunter follow her, and would never have done so. As will be
explained as appropriate in these findings, the Court credits the testimony of Hunter and discredits the testimony of
Defendant on this point. Although this point is clearly not critical to the fmdings of the Court, there are numerous
instances in which Defendant's testimony was directly at odds with other witnesses at trial, which will be identified.
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2 · Hunter explained that he had another job and could not follow her at that time, but

provided contact information. Later that day, he met her at the residence, in Herriman, Utah.
They met for "a couple of hours" and went over the scope of work she requested. No work was
performed that day, but arrangements were made to begin work the following day.
3 ·Toe primary work requested of defendant was in the garage of the property, and included
moving wires that were hung over the trusses of the garage so that a floor could be installed in
the attic of the garage. Other work included replacing power outlets, moving switches, and
moving a sprinkler control box. Defendant did not ask for a bid, but she did ask Hunter how
much the work would cost. Defendant had some materials in the garage, which she asked Hunter
to use on the project in favor of materials supplied by Plaintiff. He indicated he would use her
materials to the extent possible.
4 · The following day (Friday, March 11, 2011) Hunter returned to the Herriman property
with Blake Trip and Brick Anderson. Trip was a journeyman electrician and Anderson was an
apprentice. They arrived at the job site between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m. 2 and accessed the garage by
using a key code given to Hunter by Defendant. Their first priority was to move the wiring
across the trusses so the flooring could be placed.
5 "Defendant arrived at the residence mid-morning and remained through much of the day.
She observed some of the work in progress, and consulted with Hunter to a degree, but was
largely engaged in other projects during the day. At some point in the afternoon, Hunter left the
residence to go to Home Depot in order to purchase special wire needed to complete the
relocation of the sprinkler box. The OPS log indicates he left at 2:13 p.m. and returned at 2:51
p.m.• When he returned to the residence Defendant had left and did not return that day. Hunter
left for the day at 5:17 p.m.
6 · Hunter prepared a work order which outlined the tasks completed and the amount of time
spent by each electrician. Hunter went over the work order with Defendant, who indicated that
she was "OK " with it and wanted them to return to complete more work. She asked for a price
estimate, but Hunter explained that the pricing would be done by the company management.
That work order was presented to Defendant for signature by one of the other workers while
2 Hunter's company truck was equipped with a GPS tracking device which tracked the time and location of the truck
at any time it was operating. The log was produced to Defendant by Plaintiff as an enclosure to a letter dated April
7, 2011 providing an invoice for work done. The letter and accompanying log were introduced as Exhibit 5 at trial.
The paJ!ies stipulated that the log was off by one hour, and that a notation (as an example) of Hunter's arrival at The
Herriman property at 9:19:20 on March 11 was actually 8:19 a.m. The GPS log is critical to the Court's analysis of
the credibility of witnesses that follows.
3 The Home Depot receipt, part of Exhibit 2, indicates a time of2:41 p.m., which is consistent with the GPS log.
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"Hunter was gone to Home Depot, and Defendant signed the work order, which was admitted as
Exhibit 2. Adjacent to Defendant's signature is the following notation:
Payable 30 days net - A service charge of 2% per month which is an annual rate of 24%
will be charged on all past due accounts. Purchaser agrees to pay all costs and expenses
including reasonable attorney's fees in the event collection becomes necessary. There
will be handling and restocking charges on all returned goods.
The following Monday, Hunter attempted to contact Defendant to arrange to return to the
home to begin completion of the work. He left messages, which she did not return. He went to
the Herriman home and attempted to gain entry, but the garage code had been changed.

B. Blake Trip
8

• Blake Trip testified that he was a residential journeyman electrician wor~g for Plaintiff
in March, 2011. He accompanied Hunter to the Herriman job site on March 11, and participated
in the work done. He testified generally that he and his co-workers were busily engaged
throughout the day, and completed a large amount of work. He also testified that at some point
during the afternoon, Hunter had to go to Home Depot to purchase sprinkler wire. While Hunter
was gone, Defendant indicated she was leaving for the day. Prior to her departure, Trip
requested and obtained her signature at the bottom of the work order (Exhibit 2). He also
testified that at no time did she complain about the quality of the work done.

C. Trip Anderson
9

· Trip Anderson testified that he accompanied Hunter and Trip to the Herriman job site.
He was an apprentice electrician, and testified that he "got stuck with" the jobs no-one else
wanted to do. Because of his slight build, he often was the only one on a job site who could
access small areas such as crawl-spaces and attics. He testified that he spent the entire day in the
attic replacing the wiring so the flooring could be placed. He indicated there was a great deal of
physical labor necessary because there was an abundance of building supplies that needed to be
moved. Much of the attic had no floor, and he had to balance himself, while lying down, on the
narrow edge of roof joists and trusses. He testified that he saw Defendant "a few times" when
she came up into the attic to determine his progress, but that she was mostly in the garage.

D. Kim Olson

10
·Kim 01son testified that he is the president of Plaintiff, ID-Electric. He has worked for
the company for 45 years. He testified that in 2011, the company rate for journeyman and
apprentice electricians, respectively, was $65 and $50 per hour, which he acknowledged was "a
little above median" for the Salt Lake market. He testified that the company considered their
3
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ability to get to jobs quickly and on short notice made up for the slight premiwn over the median
market.
11 · Olson testified that there are two common billing arrangements; "cost plus" billing and
"bid" billing. In cost plus billing, the labor and materials are calculated either at the end of a job
or, in a longer, more complex project, on an ongoing basis. In bid billing, the company creates
and submits a binding bid in advance of the work done. Olson testified that most customers
prefer cost plus billing, and that is the company's default billing system.

1 2 · Olson became aware of a billing dispute with Defendant when Hunter contacted him and
asked him to go over the bill with Defendant. Hunter told Olson that Defendant "was a little off''
and that he had called to offer to go over the bill, and she had changed to code to the garage.
Olson contacted Defendant by phone, and she wanted to know how much the remainder of the
job would cost, which he inferred as a request for a bid. However, no arrangement to complete
the work was ever made.

13 ·An invoice was sent to Defendant, and ai-9:er 30 days, the company started to call
Defendant to obtain payment. They left numerous messages, which were never returned.• Olson
sent a detailed invoice on April 7 (exhibit 5) outlining the work and hours of each electrician.
On May 6, 2011, Defendant sent a letter to Olson (exhibit 6), which stated in part:
"Without an exhaustive review of the remaining tasks on the list, please be advised that it
is my considered judgment that the 2.5 hours charged for what was accomplished is
commensurately unreasonable and warrants careful reconsideration. As you undertake
that reconsideration, you might want to factor into your deliberation other salient
information: I work in both construction and the practice of law. I am very familiar with
job sites and courtrooms. I just completed the first $4.74 million phase of a 15-month
construction project in December. The second $1.5 million phase is now underway and
will be finished this summer. lhis recent construction project resulted :from a multimillion construction defect lawsuit, out of state. The last five adversaries who lined up
on the other side of a courtroom from me are out a total of more than $11 million."
14.

Olson understandably felt that Defendant was trying to intimidate him with the letter, and
he contacted counsel. He gave his attorney directions to file a mechanic's lien on the property,
which he has done only two times in the past 5 years.

4 A_pattem ~erged regarding Defendant•s unwillingness to directly confront the billing issue; in addition to
habitually falling to return phone calls, she ignored several letters and written communications, including certified
letters indicating legal proceedings would be or had been initiated. This willful neglect on the part of Defendant
contributed greatly to the costs incurred by Plaintiff in collecting the debt

4
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15·Toe company's counsel prepared a mechanic's lien for filing, and presented it to Olson
for review. Olson did not notice that the lien listed a Salt Lake City Condominium as the subject
property, rather than the Herriman house.' Olson testified that he did not intend to place a lien on
the condo, and that it would not be ethical to do so. The Court credits this testimony, and rejects
defendant's claim that the lien was placed on the condo because the condo was unencumbered by
any liens or mortgages, but the Herriman property was. As Olson pointed out in his testimony,
the mechanic's lien was for only $1827, and was placed on the property in an effort to force
Defendant to respond to repeated efforts to collect the debt. There is no evidence in the record to
support Defendant's contention that the condo was deliberately chosen as a target for the lien.
From all of the evidence, and the logical inferences to be drawn therefrom, the Court concludes
and finds that the· placement of the lien on the condo rather than the Herriman house was a
clerical error made by Plaintiff's counsel and not a deliberate act to gain tactical advantage in the
collection of the debt.
16·on November 11, 2011, Defendant delivered a letter to Olsen's office. At that time,
Defendant knew that Plaintiff was represented by counsel (this issue will be discussed in further
detail below) and she had also retained counsel, although the record is not clear that Olson knew
that at the time. This letter was introduced as Exhibit 12. Unlike Exhibit 6, which spans two
pages and is very detailed, Exhibit 12 is deliberately vague, and states in its entirely (excluding
salutations);
''Hasn't this already gone too far? First you file a lien on my property and I understand
that has recently been followed by a Iis pendens. Neither is either reasonable or justified
under the circumstances, and without a legal basis. Please remove both immediately.
There is no point in the senseless the [sic] accumulation of any more legal fees. It's
about time to do the right thing."
17· The Court finds that Defendant knew that the lien bad been placed on the wrong property,
and that she intentionally and deliberately failed to mention that fact in the letter to Olson. The
Court further finds that Defendant did so, after consulting with counsel; in a deliberate effort to
establish a cause of action against Plaintiff for filing a wrongful lien. This finding will be further
explored below during a discussion of Defendant's testimony.
18· On December 6, 2011, Olson received an email from his attorney indicating the lien had
been filed on the wrong property. Olson instructed counsel to remove the lien immediately. He
testified, and the Court finds, that this was the first date on which Olson knew the lien had been
placed on a property other than the one on which the work had been completed. The Plaintiff
5 Defendant lived at the Salt Lake City Condo, and used the address in all of her correspondence and dealings with
Plaintiff. She did not reside at the Herriman home, and shared ownership of that home with her daughter.
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filed a motion with the court to remove the lien that same day. ·••
E. Linda Gillman6
19·Defendant testified that she owns two properties in Salt Lake County; the home in
Herriman which is the subject of this lawsuit, and the Salt Lake condo on which the lien was
erroneously placed. She purchased the Herriman house in 2007 and remodeled it to
accommodate her aging mother. She was planning to update the home, particularly in the garage
area, and her primary objective was to move wiring from the trusses in the attic so that flooring
could be placed there.

20 ·nefendant testified that she is a graduate of the University of Utah College of Law (in the
70s). She testified that she has never been a member of any bar. She made the following
statements regarding her relationship with the practice of law, in the course of her testimony:
"I'm an attorney of sorts."
"I'm not a member of the bar."
"I've been practicing law for about 10 years."
"I have been working with clients but I have to be associated" with a licensed attorney.
"I do the work and they sign it."
"I have drafted most of the pleadings" in the instant case.
"I didn't draft the initial pleading but I've drafted most of the rest."
21 ·Defendant testified that she met Chet Hunter at the electrical wholesale supply, and
approached him about doing electrical work on the Herriman house. He came to the home later
in the day, and they walked through the house, looking at the projects she wanted completed.
She testified, however, that "he stood around in my kitchen for a long, long time talking about
politics." She testified that she asked for a bid, and that he told her "he would give me a number
in the morning."
22 ·nefendant testified that she arrived at the Herriman home the following morning. All
three of the electricians were there when she got there, but they were not working. The Court
discredits this testimony and finds, pursuant to the testimony of Plaintiff's witnesses, that all 3
electricians were substantially engaged in pursuit of their work during their time at Defendant's
property. Their testimony was consistent with one another, and the Court finds there testimony
truthful on that point. Moreover, as will be pointed out in detail, Defendant's testimony that the
electricians were not substantially working is contradicted not only by their collective testimony
but by objective facts and logical inferences the Court draws from those facts.
6 Defendant Gillman testified on two separate occasions. She was initially called by Plaintiff, and then testified on
her own behalf. For the sake of continuity, the Court addresses both instances together.
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23

·Defendant testified that although it seemed Hunter was working, "Blake (Trip) was
leaning on a counter" and "Brick (Anderson) was lying on a truss in the attic," but not working.
Defendant testified that she didn't comment or complain, because she thought she would only be
charged "for the time they were actually working." "It never crossed my mind that I was paying
these guys $100 an hour to do nothing." The Court finds this statement not credible. Anyone
with Defendant's professed knowledge of construction and the construction industry would
surely realize that workers on a job site, being compensated on an hourly basis, would be paid
for the entirety of their time, and would not keep track of minutes or moments during which they
were not actively engaged.
24

· Defendant testified that when she arrived at the house at 10:00, the rewiring in the attic
had already been completed. This testimony is squarely contradicted by testimony that the attic
project took all day. Further, Defendant testified that Anderson was in the attic the entire time
she was there, and that she only saw him when she went into the attic. To accept her testimony
then, would be to accept that from 10:00 a.m. to at least 3:30 p.m., when Defendant testified she
left, Anderson lay on his back in an unheated, unlit attic, on narrow trusses, doing absolutely
nothing. This testimony is at odds with the weight of the testimony in the case, and contrary to
any notion of common sense, and the Court rejects it.
25

"Defendant testified that she left around 3:30, and signed Exhibit 2 (the work order) before
she left. Hunter was not there at the time, and the work order was presented by Trip. She
testified that she did not read the paragraph (regarding payment terms) at the bottom of the form.
She acknowledged, however, that it is common language on construction fonns, with which she
is very familiar.
26

· Regarding Defendant's testimony about the work done on March 11, there is a wealth of
evidence that contradicts her. As an example, she testified that she observed while Hunter and
Trip "fished" the wire and did the other work necessary to move the sprinkler box, and that work
was completed before Hunter left. However, the objective evidence is clear that Hunter left in
mid-afternoon to obtain that very wire, and that Defendant was gone by the time he returned.
Defendant testified that Hunter left more than once; first to get the wire, and then again before
she left at 3:30. That testimony is contradicted both by fact and logic. The OPS logs make clear
that after returning from Home Depot, Hunter did not leave again until 5: 17, long after
Defendant was gone. Further, he returned with the wire at 2:51. It is unreasonable to infer that
there was time for Hunter and Trip to complete the sprinkler box removal, and for Hunter to
leave again, before Defendant left at 3:30. Defendant's testimony regarding the events of that
day are largely contradicted by objectively believable evidence.

7

R. 653

27

· Defendant testified that the following Monday, March 14, Kim Olson called_her, and told
her the bill for the work to date was $1827. She expressed to him that she was "stunned" by the
amount, and remembered saying, "for one day?" She testified that "after Mr. Olson called me, it
was pretty clear what had happened. I didn't want these people working for me any longer."
She said that she never talked to Hunter again, and that she left town "a day or two after." She
testified that she got a "couple" of voicemails from Hunter because he wanted to get back into
the house to finish the work," but she never called him back. In another contradiction,
Defendant testified that she had changed the code on the garage door over the weekend. At an
earlier time, she testified that she changed the code after she had talked to Olson and found out
how much they intended to charge her.
28

· Defendant testified that she asked for a breakdown of charges after she received the
invoice from Plaintiff. She also testified that she knew the company was trying to reach her, but
she was neither taking nor returning their calls. She also testified she never received a certified
letter sent by Plaintiff's counsel, urging her to pay the invoice, and suggesting legal action would
be taken if she did not (exhibit 7) Nor did she receive Exhibit 8, another letter from counsel
dated June 15, notifying her that a mechanic's lien had been placed on her property.
29

• Defendant testified she didn't receive the letters because she was out of town for much of
the time between March and mid-June, 2011. Notably, Defendant provided absolutely no
evidence indicating the dates she was gone, where she was, or the dates she was back in town.
The inference from her testimony is that she never received the notices for the certified mail,
which she did not therefore pick up from the post office. Again, the Court rejects her testimony.
By all observations, including her own testimony, Defendant is a capable, accomplished
business-woman who keeps meticulous records and appears to retain everything. Any
documentation of business travel would have been required for business and tax purposes, and
could have easily been provided to the Court in support of her contention that she was gone for
the entirety of this critical period. The fact that she provided no such testimony or
documentation, coupled with her admissions that she continually avoided returning phone calls
and correspondence from Plaintiff, leads the Court to conclude that her avoidance of these letters
was willful rather than circumstantial.

•

30

· Defendant spoke with counsel for Plaintiff on June 16, and he told her a lien had been
filed on her property. She went to the County Recorder's office to confirm the lien, but could
not. She did not look to determine whether a lien had been filed on the condo, but checked only
the Herriman house. Defendant testified that she was served with the pending lawsuit on
September 25, 2011, and that it was the first time she realized that the lien had been placed on
the wrong property.
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31 · Defendant testified that she obtained counsel in mid-October, because she wasn't very
well-versed in Utah law and wanted to find someone who was. Regarding Exhibit 12, the letter
demanding the lien be removed, she testified that she delivered the letter to Plaintiff personally
"on the advice of counsel.'" She testified that she knew that the failure to remove the lien within
10 days would result in a potential damage claim in her favor against Plaintiff.

32 ·Again, the Court rejects Defendant's testimony on this score. Defendant is admittedly
trained in the law, and is engaged in the practice of law, albeit without a license. Her suggestion
that she and her counsel determined that in order to be effective the letter would have to be
delivered directly by her to Plaintiff is not only an invalid legal conclusion, it is an improper one.
She and her counsel both knew that Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and presumably her
counsel knew, even if she did not, that direct communication with a represented party in a
violation of the Canons of Ethics. The Court finds that Defendant's decision to deliver the letter
personally, whether on advice of counsel or not, was a deliberate attempt to obscure the reason
she believed the lien was improper, and thereby set up a claim of wrongful lien. The Court finds
that Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that any such letter authored or signed by
her counsel and directed to Plaintiffs counsel, would by ethical standards be required to contain
more particularity regarding the factual or legal inadequacies of the mechanic's lien. 1bis
finding is further supported by the testimony of Defendant, who acknowledged that she and her
counsel emailed several drafts of the letter back and forth before agreeing on the final version.
Given the paucity of the letter, it becomes even more clear that it was intentionally vague in an
attempt to lay a trap for improper or wrongful lien.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT DAMAGES AS
SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF

33.

Plaintiff claims, and the Court finds, that there was a binding contract between Plaintiff
and Defendant. The necessary elements are present. Gillman's request for Plaintiffs
services, given to Hunter at the electrical supply warehouse, constitutes an offer to contract.
Plaintiff's acceptance is evidenced by Hunter's act of going to the Herriman home and
completing the scope of work, and arranging for a crew of electricians to begin work the
following day. Thus, offer and acceptance are present.

34.

There is clearly a meeting of the minds. Plaintiff expected to be paid for the work and

7 It is important to note that the counsel identified by Defendant as having shared this advice was NOT counsel who
represented Defendant at trial.
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materials provided, and Defendant clearly expected to pay. Although the exact costs and
work were not confirmed at the outset, Defendant was well-versed in construction contracts,
and knew to expect that she would be billed for both supplies and labor. The fact that she
expressed dissatisfaction about the amount billed does not diminish the fact that she
undertook a responsibility to pay. Moreover, she signed the work order, which had been
substantially completed (albeit without prices) at the time. By doing so she acknowledged
not only an obligation to pay, but an undertaking to pay a service charge and collection costs,
to include attorney's fees, in order to enforce the contract.
35

· Plaintiff substantially performed the terms of the contract. Although disputed by
Defendant, the Court has found that the electricians provided by Plaintiff were continuously
and properly engaged in the work for which they were employed. In her testimony
Defendant went to great lengths to point out that many of the tasks performed by them were
menial in nature, and she demonstrated that she could have done many of them herself. That
misses the point. Defendant engaged the services of trained electricians, and had to lmow
that they would be compensated the same amount (as Olson testified) for changing a light
bulb as for replacing a circuit box or performing some other sophisticated procedure.
Further, as outlined above, Defendant has dramatically understated the amount of work
performed by Plaintiff, and the time it took. The Court has rejected her testimony on that
score. The Court concludes that the work order accurately reflects the goods and services
provided to Defendant pursuant to the contract.

36

· Further, the contract carries a provision for service charges, collection costs and

attorney's fees. 1bis provision was aclmowledged by defendant both at the time of receipt
and at trial. There is no ambiguity in the contract, and no dispute that defendant was aware
of the provision when she signed it.
37

· Plaintiff has argued to the Court that, in the event there is no valid contract, principles of
unjust enrichment provide the basis for judgment. In light of the Court's ruling on the
validity of the contract, the Court will not address the issue of unjust enrichment.

2. PLAINTIFF IS NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM A WRONGFUL
LIEN
38

·Defendant's reliance on Hutterv. Dig-it 2009 UT 69,219 P.3d 918, is misplaced. The
Hutter case does stand for the proposition, as propounded by Defendant, that a mechanic's lien is
unenforceable under circumstances similar to those presented here. However, that issue is not
before the Court. Plaintiff in this case is not making any effort to enforce the lien, and removed
the lien as soon as it was learned that it had been placed on the wrong property. Rather,
10

R. 656

Defendant seeks to utilize the Wrongful Lien statute (38-9-2(3) as a bludgeon rather than a
shield.
39

·As pointed out by Plaintiff, the lien here is not "wrongful" under the wrongful lien act. A
lien is not ''wrongful" because it is inaccurate or misidentifies the property it seeks to encumber.
The lien is "authorized by statute" which takes it out of the definition of a wrongful lien. As the
Hutter Court explained, a lien that is ultimately proved unenforceable is not a wrongful lien by
virtue of that fact alone.
4 o.Further, the evidence supports that there was a good-faith basis for filing the lien, and the
Court finds that the lien was misplaced due to an explainable error. Although the work was done
on the Herriman property, Defendant used her condo address as a billing address and in all of her
correspondence with Plaintiff. Although it evidences a lack of thoroughness, the use of the
billing address in the lien is an understandable error. There is no evidence in the record to
suggest that the lien was misplaced in an effort to cause damage to Defendant or to gain a legal
or tactical advantage.
41

•

·Conversely, the record is abundantly clear that, realizing Plaintiff's error in filing the lien,
Defendant made a determined effort to capitalize on that error to her advantage. Clearly,
Defendant suffered no harm from the misplaced lien, and her "lying in wait" strategy had at least
one positive effect, from her standpoint. It made the lien unenforceable, and the delay created a
legal impediment to Plaintiff's filing of a subsequent lien on the correct property. The Court
sees no impropriety in such a defensive tactic, but will not recognize it as an appropriate cause of
action to obtain damages against Plaintiff.

3. ATTORNEY'S FEES .

•

a.
42

Plaintiff's fees

has

• The Court
determined that Plaintiff prevails in its breach of contract claim. The contract
itself has a provision for attorney's fees. In its written argument, Plaintiff has not claimed an
amount for attorney's fees, but has not waived the right to do so. The Court finds that Plaintiff
may be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in this matter, and directs Plaintiff to submit a
proposed order regarding attorney's fees.

b.

Defendant's fees

43

· The Court has found against Defendant on the breach of contract claim, and has similarly
ruled against Defendant on her wrongful lien claim. The Court has recognized no cause of
11

R. 657

action for which Defendant may be entitled to fees.
44

· Moreover, it is clear, and the Court finds, that the expenses in this case, born by both parties,
have been exacerbated by Defendant's continued and unreasonable efforts to avoid paying a
contractual obligation, and by attempting to use Plaintiff's harmless (and arguably beneficial, to
Defendant) error to create a wrongful lien cause of action. It is therefore appropriate that
Defendant bear the costs of Plaintiff's fees as well as her own.

ORDER
45

·rt is the order of the Court that Defendant is directed to pay to Plaintiff the following
amounts:
46 · t. $3,393.09, representing damages due to breach of contract, including service fees
(interest) through November 20, 2014.
47
· 2. An amount of interest, pre-and-post judgment, to be determined by the Court based on
submission by Plaintiff and rebuttal by Defendant.
48 · 3. Attorney's feels in an amount to be determined by the Court based on submission by
Plaintiff and rebuttal by Defendant.
49

· It is the further order of the Court that Defendant's claim based on wrongful lien be, and the

same is hereby, dismissed.

SO ORDERED thistfliay of January, 2015.

12
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 'fmRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

1-D ELECTRIC, INC.,
Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
ATIORNEY'S FEES

Case No. 110917777

LINDA T. GILMAN,
Defendant.

Judge RICHARD D. McKELVIE
DATE: June 8, 2015

11 • This matter is before the Court on Plaintif:f s Motion for Attorney's Fees, Costs and
Interest. The matter was heard by bench trial and the Court entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff
on January 29, 2015. The Court thereafter denied Defendant's Motion to Amend Ruling on
March 18, 2015. Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant motion and accompanying memorandum,
and Defendant filed an appropriate response with exhibits. The Court, having reviewed the
pleadings and the record in this case, enters the following order.
2 • The Court previously held that Defendant was responsible for damages based upon
Defendant's breach of contract. The Court also ruled that Defendant's claim for wrongful lien
was improper, and that claim was dismissed.
3 • The Court reserved on the issue of attorney's fees, but expressly stated:
"Moreover, it is clear, and the Court finds, that the expenses in this case, born by both
parties, have been exacerbated by Defendant's continued and unreasonable efforts to avoid
paying a contractual obligation, and by attempting to use Plaintiff's harmless (and arguably
beneficial, to Defendant) error to create a wrongful lien cause· of action. It is therefore
appropriate that Defendant bear the costs of Plaintiff's fees as well as her own.'' (Order, January
20, 2015).
4 "Plaintiff seeks fees in the amount of $29,144, and costs in the amount of $465.32. Defendant
argues that "approximately half of total attorney fees on both sides of this case was spent
asserting/defending the unlawful lien claims that Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed or summarily

R. 815
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•

lost." Although Defendant correctly asserts that many of the fees involved the litigation over a
mechanic's lien, she is incorrect in her assertion that those generated fees are the result of
Plaintiff's own actions. The Court's earlier ruling is in contravention of that argument.

5

·First, it must be noted that the Court determined that the lien was not "unlawful." Although
the lien was filed against the wrong property, the Court determined that the errant filing was
inadvertent and was corrected immediately upon Plaintiffs counsel learning of the error.
Notwithstanding that correction, Defendant insisted on pursuing a cause of action for wrongful
lien, both through motion for summary judgment and at trial. The mechanic's lien issue became
the ''tail wagging the dog" in this case, and Defendant was relentless in her pursuit of it. Indeed,
although Defendant argues that she made repeated attempts at settlement in this matter, Plaintiff
alleges by Affidavit of counsel that none of her settlement offers included a settlement of her
"wrongful lien" cause of action.
«».Defendant correctly asserts: "Why attorney fees escalated to more than 32 times Plaintiff's
underlying con~ct claim cannot be ignored." Yet, Defendant then does her best to ignore the
cause, casting blame on Plaintiff for filing a mechanics lien after its repeated attempts to collect a
valid debt went not just unanswered, but literally ignored.
7

·The Court does not excuse Plaintiff's error, and finds that $3,632 of its claimed fees were
generated as a result of "active litigation of the Mechanic's Lien." Plaintiff's reply brief, p. 4.
Accordingly, the Court is of the view that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover those fees, and the
award of attorney's fees will be reduced by that amount.
8

• However, the Court has previously determined that the driving force behind this litigation
was Defendant's intractable position that the original charges for services were unreasonable,
and her steadfast determination to take advantage of an inadvertent clerical error committed by
Plaintiff's counsel. It is extremely doubtful that this matter would have extended to a three-day
trial (or gone to trial at all) over the initial claim based on work performed and not paid for.
Defendant made a strategic decision to take advantage of the misplaced lien, not only as a means
of avoiding the original debt, but as a means of punishing Plaintiff for taking action against her.
Her own words, cited to in the Court's verdict in this matter, underscore this fact:
"Without an exhaustive review of the remaining tasks on the list, please be advised that it
is my considered judgment that the 2.5 hours charged for what was accomplished is
commensurately unreasonable and warrants careful reconsideration. As you undertake
that reconsideration, you might want to factor into your deliberation other salient
information: I work in both construction and the practice of law. I am very familiar with
job sites and courtrooms. I just completed the first $4.74 million phase of a 15-month

•

2

R. 816

construction project in December. The second $1.5 million phase is now underway and
will be finished this summer. This recent construction project resulted from a multimillion construction defect lawsuit, out of state. The last five adversaries who lined up
on the other side of a courtroom from me are out a total of more than $11 million."
Letter from Defendant to Plaintiff, dated May 6, 2011.
90

To Plaintiff, this action was nothing more than an effort to collect a valid debt. To
Defendant, it appeared to be an affront to her professional abilities and her sense of propriety.
The Court views defendant as primarily, if not solely, responsible for the excessive and
unnecessary costs associated with this case, and hereby ORDERS as follows:
Defendant is to pay Plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of $25,512 (sought fees of
$29,144 less $3632 discussed above.
Defendant is to pay Plaintiff's costs in the amount of 465 .32.
Defendant is to pay Plaintiff 24% per annum interest on the above amounts calculated
from the <;late of judgment and adjusted for any amounts already taken into consideration
by the calculations of Plaintiff's counsel in it' prayer for an award amount.

SO ORDERED this

f' day of June, 2015.

3
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Tab 3

Brady T. Gibbs #11049
WRONA GORDON & DUBOIS, P.C.
11650 S. State St., Suite I 03
Draper, Utah 84020
Ph: 801.676.5252
Fax: 801.676.5262
Email: gibbs@wgdlawfinn.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

I-D ELECTRIC, INC. a Utah Corporation,

APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT
OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case Number: 110917777

LINDA T. GILLMAN,

Judge Richard McKelvie

Defendant.

Plaintiff I-D Electric, Inc. ("Plaintiff') by and through its counsel of record, and pursuant
to the Judgment entered by this Com1 on July 9, 2015 (the "Judgment"), a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A," and hereby requests that the Court augment the Judgment in the
amount ofreasonable attorney's fees expended in obtaining this Judgment from February 4, 2015
through July 14, 2015.

As grounds for this Application, the current Judgment amount includes only those costs
and attorneys fees incurred through February 4, 2015, together with interest from the date of the
Court's January 29, 2015 Order. Since February 4, 2015, additional attorney fees have been
necessarily incurred in pursuing this action to Judgment. These fees are compensable pursuant to
the terms of the underlying contract and paragraph 5 of the Judgment.
This Application is supported by the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Cost in Support of
this Application, filed concurrently herewith.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter the accompanying First
Amended Judgment, augmenting the original Judgment in the amount of $5,481.27 for a total
augmented Judgment amount of$36,939.29.
Dated this

15th

day ofJuly, 2015.
WRONA GORDON & DUBOIS, P.C.

ls/Brady T. Gibbs
Brady T. Gibbs
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Tab 4

Brady T. Gibbs #11049
WRONA GoRDON & DuBOIS, P.C.
11650 South State Street, Suite 103
Draper, Utah 84020
Telephone: (801) 676-5252
Facsimile: (801) 676-5262
Email: gibbs@wgdlawfirm.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
(450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84114)

I-D ELECTRIC, INC., a Utah Corporation,

FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Case Number: 110917777

vs.

LINDA T. GILLMAN,

Judge Richard McKelvie

Defendant.

The Court having previously entered Judgment against Defendant, Linda T. Gillman on
July 9, 2015 (the "Original Judgment"), which provides that "This Judgment may be augmented
upon proper application by Plaintiff for costs and attorney fees incurred in collecting the total
judgment amount," and Plaintiff having accrued an additional $5,481.27 in costs and attorneys'
fees between February 4, 2015 and July 14, 2015 which have not otherwise been included in the
Original Judgment, and which costs and fees are compensable pursuant to the underlying

•

July 17, 2015 09:44 AM

1 of 3

contract at issue in this action,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that:
1. The Original Judgment is augmented in the amount of$5,481.27 for a total
Judgment amount of$36,939.29.
END OF ORDER
Entered by the Court on the date indicated by the Court's Seal at the top of the first page

July 17, 2015 09:44 AM

2 of 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 15th day of July, 2015, pursuant to Rule 5(b)(l)(a)(i), I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing First Amended Judgment to be delivered via
Utah State Bar electronic filing system and/or via the method of delivery checked below to the
following:
Mark D. Stubbs
FILMORE SPENCER, LLC
3301 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604

First Class U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Facsimile Transmission
Personal Delivery
Email Transmission Attachment

Isl Gwen Mortensen

July 17, 2015 09:44 AM
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••
1-D Electric, Inc.
Electrical Conl ractors

INVOICE NO.

INVOICE

84 49

3690 South 500 West. Suite 101
Salt lako City, Utah 84115

Phone (801) 268- 1471

•
BILL
TO

CUSTOMER

Linda Gillman
753 Shady Creek Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84106-154 7

PURCHASE ORDER NO.

G ILLIN

ITEM NO.

JOB

GILLIN 4708 Canary Bird Cove

BILL TH RU

S11316

QUANTITY

TER MS

INVOICE DATE

3/24/11

Net 30

DESCRIPTION

UNIT PRICE

PAGE

1

EXTENDED PRICE

S11316
Supply and install material and labor for the
following:
Relocate wiring in attic area
Add light and switch in closet
Relocate sprinkler control box
Add outlet for sprinkler control box
Add switch for attic lights
Change devices to brown
Insta ll light above garage sink

2

1
1
4
1
1
175
1
1
2
2
1
7
50
40

3/10/ 11
Labor: Chet
3/1 1/ 11
3 gang nail up
2 gang cut in
S ing le pole togg le
P-1
P-3
12-2 romex
4/3 round cut in
, 4/3 barha nger
4 square special
4 square blank
RCR50
1 gang deep nail up
8" 1 hole zipties
Staples

65 .00

130.00*

3.20
1.77
1.75
0.50
2.00
0.55

3.20*
1.77*
7.00 *
0.50*
2.00 *
96.25*
3.56*
3.65*
4.80*
3.54*
0.80 *
8.61 *
50 .00*
4.00*

3.56
3.65
2.40
1.77
0.80

1.23
1.00
0.10

SALE AMOUNT

PLEASE RETURN YELLOW COPY WITH YOUR PAYMENT.
TERMS - Payment is due wit11in 30 days from invoice date. 2% per mont h (24% annual) interest charged on
overdue accounts. If court action becomes necessary, customer agrees to pay all costs and attorney iees.

CUSTOMER COPY

INVOICE NO.

INVOICE

1-D Electric, Inc.
Electrical Contraci ors

84849

3690 South 500 West, Suite 10 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 115

Phone (801) 268-1 471

•
BILL

TO

CUSTOMER

Linda Gillman
753 Shady Creek Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84106-1547

PURCHASE ORDER NO.

GILLIN

•

ITEM NO.

JOB

GI LLIN 4708 Canary Bird Cove

B ILL TH RU

S11316

QUANTITY

55
6
200
1
1
8.5
8.5
8.5

Net 30

DESCRIPTION

Wirenuts
P-14 blanks
14/2 romex
Wire
Wire twist
Labor: Chet
Labor: Bric
Labor: Blake

* means item is non-taxable

PLEASE RETURN YELLOW COPY WITH YOUR PAYMENT.

•

INVOICE DATE

TER MS

TERMS - Payment is due within 30 days from invoice date. 2% per mont h (24% annual) interest charged on
ove rdue accounts. If court action becomes necessary, customer agrees to pay all costs and attorney fees .

3/24/11

UNiT PRICE

0.15
0.75
0.32
27.68
1.00
65.00
50.00
50 .00

SALE AMOUNT

PAGE

2

EXTENDED PRICE

8.25*
4.50*
64 .00*
27.68*
1.00*
552 .50*
425.00*
425.00*

1,827.61

$1,827.61
CUSTOMER COPY

~~ i

1NVOICE

84849

.

•
BILL
TO

Linda Gillman
753 Shady Creek Place
Sel\ lake City , UT 84106-1547

CUSTOMER

1.

PURCHASE ORDER NO.

GILLIN

S1 ·1316

ITEM NO.

JOB

GILLIN 4708 Canary Bird Cove

SI LL TliAU

I

55
6
200
1
1

8.5
8.5
8.5

I

Net 30

UNIT PRICE

DES CRIP'rlON

QUAN TITY

I

Tr.RMS

V\/irenu ts
P-14 blanks
14/2 roniex
Wire
Wire twist
Labor: Chet
Laber: Bric
Labor: Blake

IMI/OICE DA,E

3124/1 1

I

PAGc

I2 I

EXTENDED PRICE

0.15

a.2s·

0.75

4.50'
64.00'
27.68'
1.00

0,32

27 .68

I

1.00
65.00

ss2.so~

50.00
50.00

425.00;.
425.oo·
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• means item is non-taxable

PLEASE RETURN YELLOW COPY \flfiTH YOUR PAYMENT .
"TERMS - Paymen! is due wilhin 30 d~ys from in·,oice dato. 2% per month (24 ¼ ann ua l) i~leresl charge:i on
overdue uccou!11s. II c ourt a: '.ion beco:nes ne:ess.,ry, cu stome: agrc es to pay a I D land attorney iees.

SA LE AMo u:~r

1,827.61

$1 ,827 .61
REMITTAMCE CO!
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Tab 7

~-D E!ectric 1 !nc.
Electrical Contractors

•
Ap1il 7, 20 11

•

Linda Gillman
753 Shady Creek Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84106-1547

RE: 4708 Canary Bird Cove

•

•

Dear Linda,
Enclosed are the Professional Credentials of each of our electricians. A copy of each license, the
years they have been with I-D Electric and the homs worked within that period of time. Also
enclosed you will find the GPS reports from our company truck. Chet's first appointment on
March 10 th is a single sheet showing times and mileage. The second time out with Bric and
Blalce shows the same information for the date of March 11 th • The hours written in red are the
correct times. The GPS system did not change over to daylight savings time therefore it shows
exactly and hours difference in time.
Below you will find a breakout per your request for each electrical task billed for:

•

•

•

Relocate wiring in attic area

Bric

Add light and switch in closet

Blake 1.5 hours

Relocate sprinkler control box

Chet

2.5 hours

Add outlet for sprinkler control box Chet

1.5 hours

Add switch for attic lights

Chet

1 hour

Change devices to brown

Blake 2

Install light above garage sink

Blake

1.5 hours

Drive time

Chet
Blake
Bric

.5 homs
.5 hours
.5 homs

3690 South 500 West # 101

8 hours
Blake 3 homs
,.,
Chet .) hours

Salt Lake City, Uta h 84115

hours

(80 1) 268-1471

FAX (801) 268-2112

This breakout shows each job with the electrician that worked on the job and the hours spent on
each job. The time spent on the electrical comes to exactly 25.5 hours. Blake is also a
Residential Journeyman which is usually billed out at $65 .00 an hour and we only billed him out
at $50.00 per hour hoping you would find some relief in this. Billing him out at $50.00 saved
you an additional $127.50.
Hopefully this information will more than clarify any misgivings you may be having with the
electrical work at 4708 Canary Bird Cove. If you do need further clarification on any of the work
preformed, please call and we will have Chet personally meet with you. He will be able to go
over all work preformed by our electricians per your request.
We are looking forward to having this taken care of in a timely manner. If there are any
questions, please get call as soon as possible as to not hold up this business transaction any

further.

SinA£ _
Kim Olson

(' -

I-D Electric

•----------------------

Tab 8

Linda Gillman
753 Shady Creek Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 l 06

May 6, 2011

1-D Electric, Inc.

3690 S. 500 W.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attn: Kim Olson
Dear Mr. Olson,
I have been working on my house in Herriman for quite a while. I am extremely busy and finishing it has
been frustrating, a consequence of my lengthy absences from Utah. l encountered Chet Hunter in the
parking lot of EWS on 45 th South in March and arranged for some electrical work. He came out that
afternoon and spent some time going through everything that remained to be done in the house and
the garage. Chet returned the following day with two others, all of whom were there by the time I
arrived about 10:00. I left about 3:30. I had first-hand opportunity for observation.
When I returned to the house the next day, the only work accomplished was in the garage, though not
everything necessary in the garage was completed. I got a bill for the stunning amount of $1,827.61. l
then asked for an allocation of hours among tasks on the list.
There is no question in my mind that the billed hours are significantly inflated beyond a reasonable
amount. As an example, 14 hours are claimed for moving exactly 4 electrical cables, two of which power
the ceiling lights in the garage, while the other two power the fixtures on either side of the garage door
outside. All were simply draped over the rafters to their destinations and were rerouted to the center of
the trusses, to clear the obstruction for installing a floor across the rafters. There was nothing exotic
involved and the distance from fixtures to truss centers was short. There is permanent ladder access
into the garage attic through retracting ceiling hatches in two places, making movement in and out of
the area fast and easy.
Without an exhaustive review of the remaining tasks on the list, please be advised that it is my
considered judgment that the 25.5 hours charged for what was accomplished is commensurately
unreasonable and warrants careful reconsideration. As you undertake that reconsideration, you might
want to factor into your deliberation other salient information: I work in both construction and the
practice of law. I am very familiar with job sites and courtrooms. l just completed the first $4. 74 million
phase of a 15-month construction project in December. The second $1.5 million phase is now underway
and will be finished this summer. This recent construction project resulted from a multi-million

construction defect lawsuit, out of state. The last five adversaries who lined up on the other side of a
courtroom from me are out a total of more than $11 million.
I hired another licensed electrician to finish the work in my house and garage. What remained after the
only day Chet was there is substantially more complicated, representing at least five times more work. I
paid $650 for all of it {labor only).
I am willing to pay a realistic amount for the work that was done, but no more. Please recalculate it.
Very truly yours,

Linda Gillman

Tab 9

11198777
01191io111:41:00 PM $10.00
Book - 9930 Pg - 9520
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Wheti recorded return to:

· Wl'OllB-LawOffiees, P.C.
Brady T. Gibbs. Esq.

GaryW. Ott

11650 South State Street, Suite 103
Draper, UT 84020

Recorder, Salt Lake County, UT
CORNERSTONE TIT'LE·JNS AGGY LLC
BY: eCASH, DEPUTY - EF 1 P.

NOTICE OFMEmNIC'S LIEN
NOTICE OF MEGHANJ:C'S LlEN IS HEREBY GIVEN by WRONA LAW OFFICES, P.C., duly authorized agent
of I~D :Electrlc, Inc,, 3690 Soirth. 500 West, Suite 101~ Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, (801) 26fM471 (the ''Li.en
Claim.ant"). Said agent hereby gives notice oftb.e intention of the Lien Claimant to hold and claim a mechanic's lien
and right of cm agail;lst any rele'Vant bond, by virtue of and in accordance with the provisions ofUmh. Code Ann.
§§ 38-1-3 et seq. (1953 as ameni!ed)). The Mecbanic's Lien is against the real property and improvements thereon
owned or reputed to be owned by Linda T. Gillman. Said real property js located at 753 Shady Creek Place, Salt
Lalre City, Sa-It L11ke County, Utah and is more particularl.y described 118 follows:

UNIT 31, SHADYBROOK. CONDOMINIUM PROJECT, TOGET.BER wnH A 1.02% INTBRBST .IN
THE COMMON .AKB.AS', ALL ACCORDlliG TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON RECORD IN
1'.ij8 SALT LAKE COUN1Y RECORDER'S OFFICE..

Tax Id. No.: 16-29-358-Q32
The Lien Clannant was employed by and did provide elec:tncal services at .the request ef Ms. Linda Gill.mail for the
benefit and improvement of the above-deson"bed real property. The Lien Claim.ant's material and services were first
provided on-0r about March 1Os 2011and last provided on or about March 1~ 2011. There is due. and qwing to the
Lien Claimant the smn of $l,864.16, together with interest at the rare of 24% per mumm, .attomey fees and oosti;
associated ,i,itb. collection.

PROTECTION AGAINST LIENS AND CIVJL ACTION
NOTICE. IS BBRl:IBY PROVIDED in aooordance with Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-108 th.at under Utah law an.
"owner'' may pa protected against lien& being mafutained a:g~ an "ovmer-occupied residence" and from other
civil aptiol! baw,g ma:illia:il!ed to recover monies owed for "qualified services-" performed or provided by snppliera
and subcontraqtOI3 as part of this contract, if ancf only if the following conditions are satisfi(;}d: (1) the owner ent.ered
into a written. ct)ntract with. an origi:nal contraotor, -fac:tory built hol.lSing retailer. or a real estate developer; (2) tbe

original contractor was pr.operly licensed or exempt from licensm'e under Title 58, Chapter '55, Utah Construstion
'I'rai;les Licensing Act at the time the contract was executed; {3} the owner paid in fbil. 'the original contractQr, factory
built hC11.l$illg rctiiler, (j! real estate deveioper or their successors or assigns in accordance with the written contract
and any written or oral amendments to ~ contract; and (4) ,AI). owner who has satisfied l:!.ll of-these conditions may
perfect his protection from liens- by applying for a Certificme of Compliance wfrh the Division of Occupational anii
Professional Lic6lllling by calling (801) 530-6628 or toll free.iJ;l Utah only (.866) 275-'3675 and requesting tcr speak to
the Lien Recovery Fund.

DAT.ED this "bt!'- day of June, 2011.
W'R0NALAw·OmCES, p.

~------,
Brady T. Gibbs, Esq,

Attorney for I-D Electric, Inc.

rf'

On this
day of June, 2011, personnliy appeared before me, Brady T. Gibbs, Esq,, Attorney for I-D
Electric, Jnc., who upon oath did affirm that he is an aulhorized agent fo1· I-D Electric, Inc. and as such did
voluntarily sign the foregoing Notice of Mechanic's Lien before me.

Tab 10

----------------------------

Linda Gillman
753 Shady Creek Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

November 11, 2011

1-D Electric, Inc.
3690 s. 500 w.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attn: Kim Olson
Dear Mr. Olson,
Hasn't this already gone too far? First you file a lien on my property and I understand that has recently
been followed by a lis pendens. Neither is either reasonable or justified under the circumstances, and
without a legal basis.

Please remove both immediately.

There is no point in the senseless the

accumulation of any more legal fees. It's about time to do the right thing.
Very truly yours,

?

Received by:'--.:: 1,·~;.6.1 · (~:_:·/2:L•·-7,
Date:

.// - / / · _-::._

L' /

I
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When recorded return to:
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Wrona Law Offices, P.C.

12/6/2011 4:53:00 PM $12.00

.Brady T. Oibbs1 Esq.
II650 South State Street, Suite 103
Draper, UT 84020

Book - 9972 Pg - 5353--5354
GaryW.Ott

Recorder, Salt Lake County, UT
CORNERSTONE mLE INS AGCY LLC
BY: eCASH, DEPUTY - EF 2 P.

AiVIENDED NOTICE OF l\'IECHANIC'S LIEN
This AMENDED NOTICE OF :MECHANIC'S LIEN IS HEREBY GIVEN by WRONA LAW OFFICES, P.C., duly
authorized agent of I-D Electric, Inc., 3690 South 500 West, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, (801) 26~
1471 (the "Lien Claimant''), for the purpose of correcting the address and legal description contained :in that certain
Notice of Mechanic's Lien, previously recorded on. June 15, 2011, as Entry No. 11198777, in Book 9930, Page
9520, in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, State of Utah, and which Mechanic's Lien was filed against

that parcel of real property and improvements thereon owned or reputed to be owned by Linda T. Gillman. Said
real property is located at 753 Shady Creek Place, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah and is more
particularly described as follows:
UNIT 31, SHADYBROOK CONDOMINIUM PROJECT, TOGETHER WITH A 1.02% lNIEREST ThT
THE COMlv!ON AREAS, ALL ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON RECORD IN
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE ..
Tax Id. No.: 16-29-358-032

Said agent hereby gives notice that Lien Claimant does not intend to claim any interest in the above-referenced
property, and that the correct address and legal description of the property which the Lien Claimant intended under
the Mechanic's Lien in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann.§§ 38-1-3 et seq. (1953 as amended), is
~aainst the real property and improvements thereon owned or reputed to be owned by Anne Tracy and Linda
Tracy. Said real property is located at 4708 Canary Bird Cove, Herrimnn, Salt Lake County, Utah and is more
particularly descn'bed as follows:
Lot 663, COPPER CREEK ESTATES PHASE 6, according to the official plat thereat: as recorded in the
office of the Salt Lake County.Recorder.
Ta."'< Parcel No.: 27-30-151-037

The Lien Claimant was employed by and did provide electrical services at the request of Ms. Linda Gillman for the
benefit and improvement of the above-descnoed real property. The Lien Claimant's material and services were fust
provided on or about March 10, 201land last provided on or about March 11, 2011. There is due and owing to the
Lien Claimant the sum oUl,864.16, together with interest at the rate of24% per annum, attorney fees and costs
associated with collection.
PROTECTION AGAINST LIENS AND CIVIL ACTION
NOTICE IS HEREBY PROVIDED in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-108 that under Utah law an

"owner' may be protected ~aainst liens being maintained against an "owner-occupied residence,, and from other
civil action being maintained to recover monies owed for "qualified services" performed or provided by suppliers
and subcontractors as part of this contract, if and only if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the owner entered
into a written contract with an original contractor, factory built housing retailer1 or a real estate developer; (2) the

original contractor was properly licensed or exempt from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction
Trades Licensing Act at the time the contract was executed; (3) the owner paid in full the original contractor, factory
built housing retailer, or real estate developer or their successors or assigns in accordance with the written contract
and any written or oral amendments to the contractj end (4) An owner who has satisfied all of these conditioDS may
perfect his protection from liens by applying for a Certificate of Compliance with the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing by calling (801) 530-6628 or toll free in Utah only (866) 275-3675 and requesting to speak to

the Lien Recovery Fund.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---·-····-·-·---····---

Tab 12

Mechanic's Lien Statute
(Renumbered UCA §38-la-301}

UCA §38-1-3. Those entitled to lien --What may be attached.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter, a person who performs preconstruction
service or construction service on or for real property has a lien on the real property for
the reasonable value of the preconstruction service or construction service,
respectively, except as provided in Section 38-11-107.
{2) A person may claim a preconstruction service lien and a separate construction
service lien on the same real property.
(3) (a) A construction service lien may include an amount claimed for a
preconstruction service.
(b) A preconstruction service lien may not include an amount claimed for
construction service.
(4) A lien under this chapter attaches only to the interest that the owner or ownerbuilder has in the real property that is the subject of the lien.

Mechanic's Lien Attorney Fee Statute
(Renumbered UCA §38-la-707}
UCA §38-1-18. Attorney fees -- Offer of judgment.
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action brought
to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to
recover reasonable attorney fees, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as
costs in the action.
(2) A person who files a wrongful lien as provided in Section 38-la-308 may not recover
attorney fees under Subsection (1).
(3) (a) A person against whom an action is brought to enforce a preconstruction or
construction lien may make an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(4) (b) If the offer is not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is
not more favorable than the offer, the offeree shall pay the costs and attorney fees
incurred by the offerer after the offer was made.

@

Wrongful Lien Statute

UCA §38-9-1. 1 Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee,
trustee, or beneficial owner.
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who offers a
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a lien, or
notice of interest, or other claim of interest in certain real property.
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real
property.
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, titleholder, mortgagee,
trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real property appears
in the county recorder's records for the county in which the property is located.
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain
real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in
which the property is located.
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien, notice of
interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time
it is recorded or filed is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real
property.

1

Revised, effective May 13, 2014, numbered UCA §38-9-102

Wrongful Lien Sanctions
(Renumbered UCA §38-9-203)
UCA §38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien -- Damages.
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in Section
38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against real property
is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused by the
wrongful lien.
(2) If the person in violation of Subsection (1) refuses to release or correct the
wrongful lien within ten days from the date of written request from a record interest
holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known address of
the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record interest holder for $3,000 or for
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs.
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $10,000 or for treble
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who
records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in Section 389-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, knowing or having
reason to know that the document:
(a) is a wrongful lien;
(b) is groundless; or
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim.

Tab 13

Mark D. Stubbs (9353)
Fillmore Spencer LLC
3301 N. University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 426-8200
Fax: (801) 426-8208
mstubbs@fslaw.com
Allorneys.for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

1-D ELECTRIC, INC. a Utah Coq)oration,

DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
DISCLOSURE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 110917777

LINDA T. GILLMAN,

Judge Anthony B. Quinn

Defendant.

-

Linda T. Gillman, by and through her counsel of record, files this supplemental
disclosure pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(I ). Delivery
Notice/Reminder/Receipts dated 5/20/11, 6/17/11, 6/23/11, 8/18/11 and 8/24/11 are attached
hereto as Exhibit "A."
DATED this ~day of November, 2014.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC
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re.doIivory, or !)O to u:;ps.c::;mlrod01ivory •
or c:lll ~275-a777 to\lrr.:mgc
r~d~fyory,}

•

Printed
Na.me

·

Lea've item at my address

Deli~ery /
Address I

.tSP'?"1tyu1>iro 101""""· E:,-;;,;;pJo:

•

,

1953 s ·11po E .
.
SALT LAKE c;:1rv; UT'~4106-9998
·M-F 8,00-6:00 SAT 1 OW0-2:00
www.usps.coni/redeliv'ery or 800-ASK-USF?S-(27.5-8777)

b. Sign in section,2below;

'pcf!=h~, 'sid!Jd~. ThtsoPtionlsnot

-

-

- ~-

- - - --

~:i;~~F;::,',~~~:!~t~l:~;;ront USPS

- - , - - - - -~ - --

-----

11111 111 1111/.JHIIHll·IIIIIIII llf
5293 0368 27 41 6277'

•

United States Postal Service~

0

Sony We Missed You! We ~ Deliver for You

1-

~

lime:

Date:

------Letter

For Ocillvery: (Enter tcital number o( items
delivered byservice _type.)
;~~~~cpe,
For. Notlca·Left: (Check app/ica_ble item)
magazine,
..,,
I
d M ·1
catalog, elc. 1 -:; Expre~ Ma11·
_
nsure a1

-

T~ay' Date

Available for Pick-up After

l~-nisat:
Po_s1 Office"' (Soe b·ack)

f-

Io

_

Parcel
Restricted
Delivery

/' Certified Mail™
__

_

Perishable
Item

Fi(TTI

-

OL'ler:

Registered Mail"'

j.Must c/ai,fl within 15 days

•

If 5=heckec,!, you •or'your agont mus! beprasont
·attlme of dellvery to sign for Item.

/_. Return Receipt
for Merchandlse1-------- ------- - - - - - - - -

or article 1vil/ be rotumed)

Bill

_

Delivery
Confirmation"'

-

Signature
Confiimationn,

ArJcle Requiring P.aynien~

Amount Due

u Postage Due

$

D cob D Customs

:..J F.inaJ_Notice: Article will be returned
to senper ci:i .

•

Delive;y Notice/Ramlnder/Recaipt

PS·Form -3849, Septerntier 2009

We will ~ed1;tiver 0R you or your.agent can pick up your.mail at the Pcist Office. (Bring this form and proper ID. /{your
agent v111/-p1ck up, sign below in ifein-2, and enter.agent's name here); ·

1·

~

~

a: Cha';1' al'.tlialepp1yin.
section 3,
b.Signin sacllon2below;.
c.

~eal'flUiisnolicew/Jero

the'carrier=sea·it.
2. Sign_Here fq authoriz~ re'detiyer'j
or to authonze an·ag!inl to ,sigq
foryo!f:.

•

SUGARHOUSE POST OFFIGE
··

.•.

1953-S 1100-E
SALT LAKE CITY, UT !34106-9998
M,F, 8:00'-\,:00 SAT 10:00-2:0f
~
.usps.com/redelivery oi"800-ASK-USPS (275:./3777)
·

Del_ivery Section

· ...; Redeliver
· . · (Enterdayofweek.):
.
•·- - Signature]
·

.

3,cJ

.

(AllO\~ ~t lco~t two delivery days for
tedclivo:y, or oo lo IJ.Sp$.commJdcli\'Ory

or c,ill e00-275-llm lo ntrango
rc<lcli'l1!1)'.) .

X .

Printed
Name

I .)s3

D Leave.item at my adafess Delivery
Address .

icim;;;-·
'po_rr:JJ •, •skJo doo~. Thls oPtlon Is not

{Sp;,f-'fylll:-;;ro lo loa·vo.

.av,1 llablo If box Cs checked on'thO front
tt1qu1rino your r.lgnaturo :it tlin(IOf
dolli.;flry.J

PS Fam,

•
•

3849,

September 2009 (Reverse)

IIUl:111.IIII IIIIHHll:llllll IIUII
5293 0386 6994 9418

Uniled States Postal Service~
0
Sorry We.Missed You!We <foeliverforYou
Item is at:

·

- - Post Office"' (See back)
Dale:

•

Delivered By and Date

Delivery Notice1Reminder/Receipt

We will redeliver OR you or .your agent can pick up ymj'r in ail at the Post Office. (Bring this form and proper ID. If your
agent will ick up, si n,be/ow in item 2, and enter.·aaen/'s name here/:
a: ChockolllhiJlapplyin'
SUGARHOUSE·POST OFFICE
~
1· ·
siJction·J•

1953

b, Sign' fn•s~cl/on 2 bo/mv;
c.· LM\'9/hisl)()l'cOwhsro
lhecamorcan.saoff.

2."Sign Hera to.authorize redelivery •
or Id authorize agent to sign

an

for you:

s 1 ~ 00 E

SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84106-9998
M,F 8:00-6:00 SAT 10:0002: 00 .
www.usps,com/redelivery or 800-ASK·-USPS (275:8777)

Qelivery Section

- - -- - -- - - ---"-1Signature

3.0 Redeliver (Enlardayofwoek.}:

•

X
Pr,·nted

(Allow ai lcas!h,O,, dolivcryda}'O tor
rodolivoiy, or go lo usps.oo.7J/rvd,i/'l!!,y

Name-

orcol1800-ZTS-8mtoorrango
rodc!lvcry.J

o Leave item at my.address Delivery
- - - - - - 1 Address
(Spoc!lywf>oro fo/onvo. exomplo:
•p()ft/1 ·, "sidadool'. Thin cpt!On Is not
nvnilabfo Ir bOx'!.s chcckod on thri front

1----'----------------------

rc°qulring your aigno:ur o .it llmO Ot
d•llvcry.)

•-"~ ~

:: R(;lfused ' '

PS Fann

•

I(

g ~It,)~

l!,J igJ Jr 'lJ

q~-~furn] ·

3849, Septernber2009 (Reverse)

5293 0386 6997 8654

